Representational Subversions and the Limits of Postcoloniality: Shahzia Sikander's Strategic Contemporaneity

Transnational artist Shahzia Sikander challenges the limitations of Edward Said's postcolonial emphasis on secular humanism by deploying the heterogeneous traditions of South Asian miniature painting while strategically drawing on tradition to critique contemporaneity. Through a palimpsest process of composition, Sikander reincorporates the unknown and silenced histories implicit in the tradition of miniature painting to create social imaginaries with motifs that draw on the diverse traditions of South Asian religions and aesthetics to create a subversive politics of remembering wherein alternative images of cosmopolitanism emerge. Through a sustained analysis, this dissertation demonstrates how these alternative traditions interrogate and critique the limitations of postcolonial theory. Particularly important to this critique are some recent approaches of Third World feminists that highlight the limitations of secular humanism implicit in much of postcolonial critique. Sikander's compositions mirror these approaches as her motifs of the feminine become an intervention into the spiritual emptiness and ethical confusions of contemporaneity. In effect, Sikander's work is an intervention, a warning, and a plea for the re-invention of positive alternatives as her images embody and facilitate a critical and daring consciousness that is necessary to both our social and spiritual well-being.

China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.