2 resultados para Savela, Ari: Hostile takeovers and directors

em Digital Commons @ DU | University of Denver Research


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Equine Assisted Activities and Therapies (EAAT) including Therapeutic Horseback Riding (THR) and un-mounted equine assisted activities are interventions aimed at improving the daily functioning and success of individuals with disabilities, including those with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD). While THR is frequently utilized as a treatment intervention for children with ASD, there are many limitations (individual's weight, horse health, weather, physical limitations, health conditions, etc.) that prevent this population from participating in mounted programs. Un-mounted equine assisted activities are often utilized as an alternative, but they are not informed by empirical research or a standardized treatment model. This paper provides a comprehensive review of the literature for EAAT including un-mounted programs, examination of organizational guidelines as they apply to un-mounted programs, and consultation with program directors regarding current practices in the field, and finally it establishes recommendations for the development of a standard curriculum that would strengthen un-mounted horse care group programs serving children with ASD.

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The NYSE transformed into a for profit entity in 2006. As part of the approval process, the NYSE agreed to structurally separate the regulatory function from the business function. In doing so, the NYSE created NYSE Regulation, a non-profit with an independent board, to handle most regulatory matters. During the comment period, a spirited debate arose over the ability of a for profit company to carry out a regulatory mission. Some suggested that the regulatory function was incompatible with a "for profit" motive and that NYSE Regulation should be spun off. Others accepted the proposed structure but called for additional changes designed to reduce the possible influence of the public holding company over the regulatory function. In the end, the SEC approved the structure but with a number of prophylactic safeguards including the requirement that NYSE Regulation have a board consisting of all independent directors (save the CEO) and that directors from the for profit holding company could not make up a majority of the board. More recently, however, the NYSE has proposed to end the structural separation of the two functions and instead put in place a functional separation. The proposal would result in the termination of the delegation agreement between the Exchange and NYSE Regulation and the creation of both a Regulatory Oversight Committee of the Board of Directors of the Exchange and the creation of a Chief Regulatory Officer. This letter examines the history of the separation of the two functions and critiques the NYSE's proposal.