Everyday Indivisibility: How Exclusive Religious Practices Explain Variation in Subnational Violence Outcomes

This project explores the puzzle of religious violence variation. Religious actors initiate conflict at a higher rate than their secular counterparts, last longer, are more deadly, and are less prone to negotiated termination. Yet the legacy of religious peacemakers on the reduction of violence is undeniable. Under what conditions does religion contribute to escalated violence and under what conditions does it contribute to peace? I argue that more intense everyday practices of group members, or high levels of orthopraxy, create dispositional indivisibilities that make violence a natural alternative to bargaining. Subnational armed groups with members whose practices are exclusive and isolating bind together through ritual practice, limit the acceptable decisions of leaders, and have prolonged timeframes, all of which result in higher levels of intensity, intransigence and resolve during violent conflict. The theory challenges both instrumentalist and constructivist understandings of social identity and violence. To support this argument, I construct an original cross-national data-set that employs ethnographic data on micro-level religious practices for 724 subnational armed groups in both civil wars and terror campaigns. Using this data, I build an explanatory “religious practice index” for each observation and examine its relationship with conflict outcomes. Findings suggest that exclusive practice groups fight significantly longer with more intensity and negotiate less. I also apply the practice model to qualitative cases. Fieldwork in the West Bank and Sierra Leone reveals that groups with more exclusive religious practicing membership are principle contributors to violence, whereas those with inclusive practices can contribute to peace. The project concludes with a discussion about several avenues for future research and identifies the practical policy applications to better identify and combat religious extremism.

New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran's Rivalry

The competing powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to redress and reverse the strategic imbalance and direction of the Middle East’s regional politics. The 1979 Iranian Revolution catapulted these two states into an embittered rivalry. The fall of Saddam Hussein following the 2003 U.S. led invasion, the establishment of a Shi’ite Iraq and the 2011 Arab Uprisings have further inflamed tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia have not confronted each other militarily, but rather have divided the region into two armed camps on the basis of political and religious ideology in seeking regional allies and promulgating sectarianism as they continue to exploit the region’s weak states in a series of proxy wars ranging from conflicts in Iraq to Lebanon. The Saudi-Iranian strategic and geopolitical rivalry is further complicated by a religious and ideological rivalry, as tensions represent two opposing aspirations for Islamic leadership with two vastly differing political systems. The conflict is between Saudi Arabia, representing Sunni Islam via Wahhabism, and Iran, representing Shi’ite Islam through Khomeinism. The nature of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has led many Middle East experts to identify their rivalry as a “New Middle East Cold War.” The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has important implications for regional stability and U.S. national security interests. Therefore, this thesis seeks to address the question: Is a cold war framework applicable when analyzing the Saudi Arabian and Iranian relationship?

Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World

On September 17, 2015, the Federal Circuit issued another decision in the epic Apple v. Samsung smartphone war. This was the fourth court decision in the ongoing saga to deal with injunctions. Apple IV explained the level of proof necessary to satisfy the "causal nexus" requirement. This requirement had emerged as a response to patent litigations involving products with thousands of features, the vast majority of which are unrelated to the asserted patent. To prove a causal nexus, patentees seeking an injunction have to do more than just show that the infringing product caused the patentee irreparable harm. The harm must be specifically attributable to the infringing feature. In Apple IV, the Federal Circuit noted that proving causation was "nearly impossible" in these multicomponent cases. So it decided to water down the causal nexus requirement saying that it was enough for Apple to show that the infringing features were "important"and customer sought these particular features. This lower standard is an ill-advised mistake that leaves multicomponent product manufacturers more susceptible to patent holdup. My critique takes two parts. First, I argue that a single infringing feature rarely, if ever, "causes" consumers to buy the infringer’s multicomponent products. The minor features at issue in Apple IV illustrate this point vividly. Thus, the new causal nexus standard does not accurately reflect how causation and harm operate in a multicomponent world. Second, I explain why the court was so willing to accept such little evidence of real injury. It improperly applied notions of traditional property law to patents. Specifically, the court viewed patent infringement as harmful regardless of any concrete consequences. This view may resonate for other forms of property where an owner's rights are paramount and a trespass is considered offensive in and of itself. But the same concepts do not apply to patent law where the Supreme Court has consistently said that private interests must take a back seat to the public good. Based on these principles, the courts should restore the "causal nexus" requirement and not presume causation.