Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Attentional processes associated with victimization history and posttraumatic symptomatology in women exposed to intimate partner violence

Exposure to intimate partner violence (IPV) puts women at risk for severe and chronic physical and mental health consequences, including elevations in IPV-related psychopathology and increased risk for future victimization. Previous research has examined attention as one of the key information processing mechanisms associated with elevated psychopathology and risk for victimization; however, the nature of attentional processing in response to IPV-related information in women exposed to IPV is poorly understood. Therefore, the current study aimed to further understanding of associations between attentional processing, IPV exposure, and related distress using measures of eye movement and subjective interpretations of IPV-related information. A sample of women exposed to IPV (n = 57) viewed sets of negative, positive, and neutral relationship images for 15 s each while having their eye movements monitored and later provided subjective ratings and interpretations of levels of risk and safety in those images. We examined associations of outcome measures with proximal victimization experiences and IPV-related psychopathology (i.e., depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and dissociation). Results indicated a bias to attend to negative relationship images relative to positive and neutral images, though this attention bias fluctuated over time and varied as a function of symptomatology such that depression corresponded with increases in attention to negative images over time and PTSD corresponded with decreases in attention to negative images. The general attention bias for negative images appeared to be explained by rumination on and/or difficulty disengaging from negative images, which was related to general elevations in psychopathology as well as exposure to revictimization by different perpetrators. Subjective interpretations and perception of danger cues were related to victimization history and level and type of IPV-related distress. We replicated these procedures with a sample of undergraduate students without IPV histories or related symptomatology (n = 33) and found that the overall attention bias for negative images was not replicated, despite general similarities in patterns of attention over time. Results therefore indicated associations between attentional processing and IPV exposure and related symptomatology. Implications for models of IPV-related psychopathology and attentional processing as well as directions for future study and interventions are discussed.

Examining the relationship among genes, attention bias to emotion, and depression in youth

The investigation of biologically initiated pathways to psychological disorder is critical to advance our understanding of mental illness. Research has suggested that attention bias to emotion may be an intermediate trait for depression associated with biologically plausible candidate genes, such as the serotonin transporter (5-HTTLPR) and catechol-o-methyl-transferase (COMT) genes, yet there have been mixed findings in regards to the precise direction of effects. The experience of recent stressful life events (SLEs) may be an important, yet currently unstudied, moderator of the relationship between genes and attention bias as SLEs have been associated with both gene expression and attention to emotion. Additionally, although attention biases to emotion have been studied as a possible intermediate trait associated with depression, no study has examined whether attention biases within the context of measured genetic risk lead to increased risk for clinical depressive episodes over time. Therefore, this research investigated both whether SLEs moderate the link between genetic risk (5-HTTLPR and COMT) and attention bias to emotion and whether 5-HTTLPR and COMT moderated the relationship between attention biases to emotional faces and clinical depression onset prospectively across 18 months within a large community sample of youth (n= 467). Analyses revealed a differential effect of gene. Youth who were homozygous for the low expressing allele of 5-HTTLPR (S/S) and had experienced more recent SLEs within the last three months demonstrated preferential attention toward negative emotional faces (angry and sad). However, youth who were homozygous for the high expressing COMT genotype (Val/Val) and had experienced more recent SLEs showed attentional avoidance of positive facial expressions (happy). Additionally, youth who avoided negative emotion (i.e., anger) and were homozygous for the S allele of the 5-HTTLPR gene were at greater risk for prospective depressive episode onset. Increased risk for depression onset was specific to the 5-HTTLPR gene and was not found when examining moderation by COMT. These findings highlight the importance of examining risk for depression across multiple levels of analysis, such as combined genetic, environmental, and cognitive risk, and is the first study to demonstrate clear evidence of attention biases to emotion functioning as an intermediate trait predicting depression.