Comment Letter: The NYSE and the End of the Structural Separation between Regulatory and Commercial Interests of the Exchange

The NYSE transformed into a for profit entity in 2006. As part of the approval process, the NYSE agreed to structurally separate the regulatory function from the business function. In doing so, the NYSE created NYSE Regulation, a non-profit with an independent board, to handle most regulatory matters. During the comment period, a spirited debate arose over the ability of a for profit company to carry out a regulatory mission. Some suggested that the regulatory function was incompatible with a "for profit" motive and that NYSE Regulation should be spun off. Others accepted the proposed structure but called for additional changes designed to reduce the possible influence of the public holding company over the regulatory function. In the end, the SEC approved the structure but with a number of prophylactic safeguards including the requirement that NYSE Regulation have a board consisting of all independent directors (save the CEO) and that directors from the for profit holding company could not make up a majority of the board. More recently, however, the NYSE has proposed to end the structural separation of the two functions and instead put in place a functional separation. The proposal would result in the termination of the delegation agreement between the Exchange and NYSE Regulation and the creation of both a Regulatory Oversight Committee of the Board of Directors of the Exchange and the creation of a Chief Regulatory Officer. This letter examines the history of the separation of the two functions and critiques the NYSE's proposal.

High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment

Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment. It is beyond question that some lies – such as perjury or pretending to be a police officer – are not covered by the First Amendment. But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). To date, however, both Supreme Court doctrine and academic commentary has taken for granted that any constitutional protection for lies is purely prophylactic – it protects the liar to avoid chilling truthful speech. This Article is the first to argue, contrary to conventional wisdom, that certain types of lies paradoxically advance the values underlying the First Amendment. Our framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally important insofar as we provide the first comprehensive post-Alvarez look at the wide range of lies that may raise First Amendment issues. Because there was no majority opinion in Alvarez, there is uncertainty about which standard of constitutional scrutiny should apply to protected lies, an issue we examine at length. Moreover, our normative claim is straightforward: when a lie has intrinsic or instrumental value it should be treated differently from other types of lies and warrant the greatest constitutional protection. Specifically, we argue that investigative deceptions – lies used to secure truthful factual information about matters of public concern – deserve the utmost constitutional protection because they advance the underling purposes of free speech: they enhance political discourse, help reveal the truth, and promote individual autonomy. A prototypical investigative deception is the sort of misrepresentation required in order for an undercover journalist, investigator, or activist to gain access to information or images of great political significance that would not be available if the investigator disclosed her reporting or political objectives. Tactical use of such lies have a long history in American journalism and activism, from Upton Sinclair to his modern day heirs. Using the proliferation of anti-whistleblower statutes like Ag Gag laws as an illustrative example, we argue that investigative deceptions are a category of high value lies that ought to receive rigorous protection under the First Amendment. At the same time, we recognize that not all lies are alike and that in other areas, the government regulation of lies serves legitimate interests. We therefore conclude the Article by drawing some limiting principles to our theory.