China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.

A Discursive Perspective on China's Global Politics of Climate Change, 1992-2013

This dissertation investigates China’s recent shift in its climate change policy with a refined discourse approach. Methodologically, by adopting a neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony, a generative definition of discourse and an ontological pluralist position, the study constructs a theoretical framework named “discursive hegemony” that identifies the “social forces” for enabling social change and focuses on the role of discursive mechanisms via which the forces operate and produce effects. The key empirical finding of this study was that it was a co-evolution of conditions that shaped the outcome as China’s climate policy shift. In examining the case, a before-after within-case comparison was designed to analyze the variations in the material, institutional, and ideational conditions, with methods including interviews, conventional narrative/text analysis and descriptive statistics. Specifically, changes in energy use, the structure of decision-making body, and the narratives about sustainable development reflected how the above three types of social force processed in China in the first few years of the 21st century, causing the economic development agenda to absorb the climate issue, and turning the policy frame for the latter from mainly a diplomatic matter to a potential opportunity for better-quality growth. With the discursive operation of the “Science-based development”, China’s energy policy has been a good example of the Chinese understanding of sustainability characterized by economic primacy, ecological viability and social green-engineering. This way of discursive evolution, however, is a double-edged sword that has pushed forward some fast, top-down mitigation measures on the one hand, but has also created and will likely continue creating social and ecological havoc on the other hand. The study makes two major contributions. First and on the empirical level, because China is an international actor that was not expected to cooperate on the climate issue according to major IR theories, this study would add one critical case to the studies on global (environmental) governance and the ideational approach in the IR discipline. Second and on the theory-building level, the model of discursive hegemony can be a causally deeper mode of explanation because it traces the process of co-evolution of social forces.