China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.

North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Program : A Critical Analysis

North Korea's regime has one goal, to guarantee its survival. To accomplish that goal it desired the U.S. to maintain a strong presence on the Korean Peninsula to act as an international deterrent against possible foreign occupation of its nation. The DPRK encouraged the U.S. by signing the 1994 Agreed Framework, a formal commitment between the two countries that froze North Korea's nuclear programs in exchange for U.S. energy aid. In 2002 the Bush Administration did not honour its commitment and blamed North Korea for the Agreed Framework's collapse. North Korea retaliated by choosing to become a nuclear nation, an action guaranteed to insure a constant U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula.

Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Future of the Troubled State after Kim Jong-Il

Since 2008, international speculation about the viability of Kim Jong-Il's leadership in North Korea has been at the forefront of diplomatic discussions. North Korea is known to be a secretive state where human rights violations abound. This paper discusses the history of leadership and government in North Korea since World War II, the current human rights situation in the country, the role of China, and potential successors to Kim Jong-Il. The ramifications of impending regime change are discussed in terms of North Korea's human rights issues and economic problems. While current efforts at diplomacy have proved ineffective, the need for concerned nations, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations to be prepared to engage North Korea after Kim Jong-Il is imperative.