Representing Clients in the Marijuana Industry: Navigating State and Federal Rules

As the number of states legalizing medicinal and recreational marijuana increases and marijuana emerges as a growing lawful industry, lawyers find themselves in an awkward position. In most states, lawyers who represent clients in the marijuana industry risk discipline for assisting clients in the commission of a (federal) crime. Even in jurisdictions like Colorado, where the rules of professional conduct have been amended to permit lawyers to assist clients who comply with marijuana state laws, lawyers who are admitted to practice in federal courts risk being disciplined by these tribunals for assisting clients in the commission of a crime pursuant to the courts’ local rules of conduct. This short article explores the thorny issue of navigating state and federal rules of professional conduct while representing clients in the marijuana industry.

Public Lawyers and Marijuana Regulation

Although 23 states and the District of Columbia have now legalized marijuana for medical purposes, marijuana remains a prohibited substance under federal law. Because the production, sale, possession and use of marijuana remain illegal, there is a risk of prosecution under federal laws. Furthermore, those who help marijuana users and providers put themselves at risk — federal law punishes not only those who violate drug laws but also those who assist or conspire with them to do so. In the case of lawyers representing marijuana users and businesspeople, this means not only the real (though remote) risk of criminal prosecution but also the more immediate risk of professional discipline. Elsewhere, we wrote about the difficult place in which lawyers find themselves when representing marijuana clients. We argued that while both the criminal law and the rules of professional conduct rightly require legal obedience from lawyers, other countervailing factors must be considered when evaluating lawyers’ representation of marijuana clients. In particular, we asserted that considerations of equity and access to justice weigh dispositively in favor of protecting lawyers who endeavor to help their clients comply with state marijuana laws, and we suggested means of interpreting relevant criminal law provisions and rules of professional conduct to achieve this result. This article builds on that analysis, taking on the particular issue of the public lawyer’s’ role in marijuana regulation. For government lawyers, the key issues in exercising discretion in the context of marijuana are not clients’ access to the law and equality but rather determining the clients’ wishes and serving them diligently and ethically. Lawyers representing state agencies, legislatures and the executive branch of government draft and interpret the rules and regulations regarding marijuana. Lawyers for federal, state and local governments then interpret those rules to determine the obligations and responsibilities of those they represent and to help their clients meet those obligations and carry out their required tasks. Both state and federal prosecutors are charged with determining what conduct remains illegal under the new rules and, perhaps more importantly, with exercising discretion regarding whom to prosecute and to what extent. Marijuana regulation is not a niche area of government regulation; it will influence the practice of virtually every public lawyer in the years to come. Public lawyers must understand the changes in marijuana law and the implications for government clients. Given the pervasiveness of the modern regulatory state, the situation is no easier — and, in many ways, it is more complicated — for public lawyers than it is for private ones. Public lawyers face myriad practice challenges with respect to marijuana law reform, and while we do not purport to identify and resolve all of the issues that are sure to arise in this short paper, we hope that the article helps alert public lawyers to some of the risks involved in participating in marijuana regulation so that they can think carefully about their obligations when these issues arise.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Transgender Group Therapy: Process and Issues with Male to Female Clients

Transgender issues are garnering more attention within the mental health field. With the increased social awareness of transgender issues, the mental health field is recognizing the need for effective psychological services for this population. Transgender individuals face unique challenges related to gender non-conformity, the coming-out and transitioning processes, and in society at large, all of which can lead to a number mental health concerns. Group therapy is a promising treatment modality for transgender individuals. The purpose of this paper is to offer a rationale for the effectiveness of group therapy, and recommendations for best practices utilizing the current literature and my experience with facilitating a Male to Female transgender therapy group.

Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: Increasing Psychologists' Willingness to Assess and Treat Substance-abusing Clients.

The high prevalence of substance abuse in the United States and the low rates of assessment and treatment of these disorders by mental health providers points to a growing need to understand the factors that prevent substance-abusing individuals from receiving adequate services. Psychologists are one group of mental health providers that show little interest in working with this population and receive little research attention on the topic. This paper explores the potential role that education, previous experience, and the impact that holding stigmatizing beliefs towards substance-abusing individuals has on psychologists' willingness to provide clinical services for clients struggling with addiction. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is explored as a potential intervention for psychologists.

BigLaw Identity Capital: Pink and Blue, Black and White

This Article advances a new capital framework for understanding the bargain between large law firms and their lawyers, depicting BigLaw relationships not as basic labor-salary exchanges but rather as complex transactions in which large law firms and their lawyers exchange labor and various forms of capital — social, cultural, and identity. First, it builds on the work of Pierre Bourdieu regarding economic, cultural, symbolic, and social capital by examining the concepts of positive and negative capital, exploring the meaning of capital ownership by entities, and developing the notion of identity capital — the value individuals and institutions derive from their identities. Then, the Article advances a capital theory of BigLaw, in which large law firms and their lawyers engage in complex transactions trading labor, social, cultural, and identity capital for economic, social, cultural, and identity capital. Capital analysis sheds new light on the well-documented and troubling underrepresentation of diverse lawyers at BigLaw. It shows that the underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers is not solely the result of exogenous forces outside the control of large law firms such as implicit bias, but rather the outcome of the very exchanges in which BigLaw and its lawyers engage. Specifically, large law firms take into account the capital endowments of their lawyers in making hiring, retention and promotion decisions, and derive value from their lawyers’ capital, for example, by trading on the identity of women and minority lawyers in marketing themselves as being diverse and inclusive to clients and potential recruits. Yet, while BigLaw trades for the identity capital of women and minority lawyers, it fails to offer them opportunities in return to acquire the social and cultural capital necessary for attaining positions of power, resulting in underrepresentation. Moreover, these labor-capital exchanges are often implicit and made by uninformed participants, and therefore unjust. Exactly because the capital framework describes the underrepresentation of diverse lawyers at BigLaw as an endogenous outcome within the control of BigLaw and its lawyers, however, it is a cautiously optimistic model that offers hope for greater representation of diverse lawyers in positions of power and influence. The Article suggests policies and procedures BigLaw can and should adopt to improve the quality of the exchanges it offers to women and minority attorneys and to reduce the underrepresentation of diverse lawyers within its ranks. Employing the concepts of capital transparency, capital boundary, and capital infrastructure, it demonstrates how BigLaw can (1) explicitly recognize the roles social, cultural, and identity capital play in its hiring, retention and promotion apparatuses and (2) revise its policies and procedures to ensure that all of its lawyers have equal opportunities to develop the requisite capital and compete on equal and fair terms for positions of power and influence.