A Meta-Analytic Review of Mindfulness-Based Interventions on Symptom Reduction: A Critique and Guide for Future Investigation.

Over the past decade, mindfulness practices have been used with increasing frequency as therapeutic components within cognitive behavioral treatment regimens. As is standard practice, prescriptive uses of mindfulness intervention are incorporated to improve end-state functioning by ameliorating problematic symptoms and conditions. Common change-targets include the control of cognitive and emotional content for purposes of enhancing psychological self-regulation and physical well-being. The term mindfulness applies to a heterogeneous range of practices, methods, and techniques. While there is no singular agreed upon definition for mindfulness, as a process concept, the term connotes an immediate, non-thetic access to events, wherein each occasioning event is experienced in toto within the broader contextual event-field, and distinct from intervening conceptual themes being noticed. Training in mindfulness practices may be conducted using individual, group, or small class formats. The current paper provides a meta-analytic review of 44 treatment outcome studies (extracted 1982 through 2006), which examines the clinical utility of mindfulness as the primary therapeutic approach. Results indicated that average effect sizes for mindfulness based interventions fell within the medium range for construct category variables examined (d = .56). These findings suggest that mindfulness training is a cost-effective treatment for a wide array of contemporary psychological problems and diagnoses, in addition to fostering positive psychology attributes such as quality and satisfaction with life. A critique of the research and recommendations for future research, including a need to examine the role of mindfulness as a tool for cultivating increased psychological acceptance and life satisfaction, is presented.

Governance and Uncertainty

Government actors create law against a backdrop of uncertainty. Limited information, unpredictable events, and lack of understanding interfere with accurately predicting a legal regime���s costs, benefits, and effects on other legal and social programs and institutions. Does the availability of no-fault divorce increase the number of terminated marriages? Will bulk-collection of telecommunications information about American citizens reveal terrorist plots? Can a sensitive species breed in the presence of oil and gas wells? The answers to these questions are far from clear, but lawmakers must act nonetheless. The problems posed by uncertainty cut across legal fields. Scholars and regulators in a variety of contexts recognize the importance of uncertainty, but no systematic, generally-applicable framework exists for determining how law should account for gaps in information. This Article suggests such a framework and develops a novel typology of strategies for accounting for uncertainty in governance. This typology includes “static law,” as well as three varieties of “dynamic law.” “Static law” is a legal rule initially intended to last in perpetuity. “Dynamic law” is intended to change, and includes: (1) durational regulation, or fixed legal rules with periodic opportunities for amendment or repeal; (2) adaptive regulation, or malleable legal rules with procedural mechanisms allowing rules to change; and (3) contingent regulation, or malleable legal rules with triggering mechanisms to substantively change to the rules. Each of these strategies, alone or in combination, may best address the uncertainty inherent in a particular lawmaking effort. This Article provides a diagnostic framework that lawmakers can use to identify optimal strategies. Ultimately, this approach to uncertainty yields immediate practical benefits by enabling lawmakers to better structure governance.

Citation Methodologies in Eusebius’ Historia ecclesiastica and Other Ancient Historiography

This dissertation examines ancient historiographic citation methodologies in light of Mikhail Bakhtin’s dichotomy between polyphony and monologization. In particular, this dissertation argues that Eusebius of Caesarea’s Historia ecclesiastica (HE) abandons the monologic citation methodology typical of previous Greek and Hellenistic historiography and introduces a polyphonic citation methodology that influences subsequent late-ancient Christian historiography to varying degrees. Whereas Pre-Eusebian Greek and Hellenistic historiographers typically use citations to support the single authorial consciousness of the historiographer, Eusebius uses citations to counterbalance his own shortcomings as a witness to past events. Eusebius allows his citations to retain their own voice, even when they conflict with his. The result is a narrative that transcends the point of view of any single individual and makes multiple witnesses, including the narrator, available to the reader. Post-Eusebian late-ancient Christian historiographers exhibit the influence of Eusebius’ innovation, but they are not as intentional as Eusebius in their use of citation methodologies. Many subsequent Christian historiographers use both monologic and polyphonic citation methodologies. Their tendency to follow Eusebius’ practice of citing numerous lengthy citations sometimes emphasizes points of view that oppose the author’s point of view. When an opposing viewpoint surfaces in enough citations, a polyphonic citation methodology emerges. The reader holds the two different narrative strands in tension as the author continues to give voice to opposing viewpoints. After illustrating the citation methodologies with passages from numerous Greek, Hellenistic, and late ancient Christian historiographers, this dissertation concludes with a short computational analysis that uses natural language processing to reveal some broad trends that highlight the previous findings and suggest a possibility for future research.

Remember Not to Forget Furman: A Response to Professor Smith

Professor Robert J. Smith encourages readers, lawyers, and courts to forget Furman v. Georgia and to focus instead on death penalty challenges grounded in the diminished culpability of nearly all capital defendants. We applaud Professor Smith’s call to focus on the mental and emotional characteristics that reduce the blameworthiness of so many of those charged with capital crimes; recognizing diminished culpability as the rule rather than the exception among capital defendants conveys a reality that rarely finds its way into reported cases. We are troubled, however, by Professor Smith’s call to “forget Furman.” We believe the title and the article���s efforts to undermine Furman-based challenges disserve Professor Smith’s principal goal — addressing the United States’ broken death penalty system.

Disquieting Discretion: Race, Geography & the Colorado Death Penalty in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century

This Article demonstrates through original statistical research that prosecutors in Colorado were more likely to seek the death penalty against minority defendants than against white defendants. Moreover, defendants in Colorado’s Eighteenth Judicial District were more likely to face a death prosecution than defendants elsewhere in the state. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that even when one controls for the differential rates at which different groups commit statutorily death-eligible murders, non-white defendants and defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial District were still more likely than others to face a death penalty prosecution. Even when the heinousness of the crime is accounted for, the race of the accused and the place of the crime are statistically significant predictors of whether prosecutors will seek the death penalty. We discuss the implications of this disparate impact on the constitutionality of Colorado’s death penalty regime, concluding that the Colorado statute does not meet the dictates of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.

Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment

Recently the Supreme Court has placed new limits on both the substance of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary that serves as the principal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. In this Article we briefly summarize these limitations and then argue that the curtailment of the exclusionary rule has the potential to ameliorate substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. The limited reach of the modern exclusionary rule provides the Court with license to develop an expansive new substantive framework free of the specter of a correspondingly expansive remedial framework. One point on which nearly all jurists and commentators agree is that current Fourth Amendment doctrine is a mess. We argue that the Court’s exclusionary rule cases, while frustrating and ill-conceived if viewed in isolation, provide the Court with an opportunity to revisit problematic Fourth Amendment doctrine that was born under a very different remedial regime. Such an approach would allow the Court to adhere to its current view of the exclusionary rule as a remedy of last resort while creating a Fourth Amendment with teeth. The goal is a Fourth Amendment right that is more substantial and clearly defined, but a remedy that remains limited to egregious violations of clear substantive rules. The time is now to lift the Fourth Amendment fog.

High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment

Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment. It is beyond question that some lies – such as perjury or pretending to be a police officer – are not covered by the First Amendment. But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). To date, however, both Supreme Court doctrine and academic commentary has taken for granted that any constitutional protection for lies is purely prophylactic – it protects the liar to avoid chilling truthful speech. This Article is the first to argue, contrary to conventional wisdom, that certain types of lies paradoxically advance the values underlying the First Amendment. Our framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally important insofar as we provide the first comprehensive post-Alvarez look at the wide range of lies that may raise First Amendment issues. Because there was no majority opinion in Alvarez, there is uncertainty about which standard of constitutional scrutiny should apply to protected lies, an issue we examine at length. Moreover, our normative claim is straightforward: when a lie has intrinsic or instrumental value it should be treated differently from other types of lies and warrant the greatest constitutional protection. Specifically, we argue that investigative deceptions – lies used to secure truthful factual information about matters of public concern – deserve the utmost constitutional protection because they advance the underling purposes of free speech: they enhance political discourse, help reveal the truth, and promote individual autonomy. A prototypical investigative deception is the sort of misrepresentation required in order for an undercover journalist, investigator, or activist to gain access to information or images of great political significance that would not be available if the investigator disclosed her reporting or political objectives. Tactical use of such lies have a long history in American journalism and activism, from Upton Sinclair to his modern day heirs. Using the proliferation of anti-whistleblower statutes like Ag Gag laws as an illustrative example, we argue that investigative deceptions are a category of high value lies that ought to receive rigorous protection under the First Amendment. At the same time, we recognize that not all lies are alike and that in other areas, the government regulation of lies serves legitimate interests. We therefore conclude the Article by drawing some limiting principles to our theory.

Sex, sin and salvation : a case study of the narrative pictorial cycle of Saint Mary the Egyptian at Bourges Cathedral

This paper studies the narrative stained glass cycle of the Life of Saint Mary the Egyptian at Bourges Cathedral within the context of prevailing—and often conflicting--civil and ecclesiastical attitudes toward sex, sexual sin, and prostitution in early thirteenth century France. Although the Church maintained that sexual sin was mortal sin, civil records suggest the public was skeptical. Through the example of a penitent harlot, this window, both structurally and in thematic content, attempts to map a doctrinally appropriate path from sexual sin to purity of spirit—and salvation—through complete submission to the Church and its clergy.