Islamic Political Thought: Reviving a Rationalist Tradition

This work develops the foundations of an Islamic argument for secular, liberal democracy from within the Islamic discursive tradition. First, it challenges the presentation of contemporary Islamic political thought as a unified, continuous development of the classical canon by showing the influence of the now marginalized medieval rationalists in the development of Islamic political thought. The classical rationalist concern with divine justice forced the founders of Sunni orthodoxy to state their epistemologies and their positions on ethical ontology. The orthodox positions, and their related methods of legal-juristic reasoning, are shown to be incapable of accommodating the modern Islamic positions on political representation, slavery, and just war. This leads to the second argument of the work, that the modern Islamic discourse is better understood as a reflection of the central concern with justice and its rationalist epistemology and ethical ontology we find in the writings of classical rationalists. This argument is made by examining the works of three classical rationalists, a theologian, a philosopher, and a historian. Their political positions, shaped by their rationalism and concern with justice, challenged their orthodox contemporaries, and provide substantive critiques of the classical political accommodations, methods of politico-legal reasoning, and hence, of modern Islamist political projects. The final chapter reveals how far the mainstream of Islamic political thought has deviated from the classical discourses, since the 19th century, by adopting the language and ideals of the European Enlightenment. This shift is presented as a triumph of classical rationalism over literalism, whose epistemological foundations and ontological implications have yet to be acknowledged and appreciated.

The African-American Islamic Renaissance and the Rise of the Nation of Islam

This dissertation examines African-American Islamic culture from 1920 through 1959, a period I label the "African-American Islamic Renaissance" (AAIR). The AAIR is characterized by a significant increase in interest in Islam, extreme diversity in views about Islam, and the absence of a single organization dominating African-American Islamic culture for a significant amount of time. Previous works dealing with African-American Islam in this period have failed to fully recognize these features, particularly the last of these. As a result, explanations for the rise of the Nation of Islam (NOI) have not satisfactorily explained why it was only the NOI--and not other Islamic groups that were more popular than the NOI up until the mid-1950s--that became a "mass movement," gaining the allegiance of tens of thousands of African Americans. There has been some tendency, for instance, to assume that the NOI was the most popular African-American Islamic group by the early 1950s, a notion that is probably an inference drawn from two other popular but inaccurate assumptions: that the NOI's rise was due primarily to its radical racialized doctrines and its charismatic leaders, particularly Malcolm X, who became a popular minister for the group in the early 1950s. I argue, however, that the NOI was in fact not the most popular African-American Islamic group until at least 1955, and even as late as 1959 its official membership numbers were not particularly large by AAIR standards. Also, its doctrines were not especially unique in the AAIR, nor was its having extremely charismatic leaders. I contend that the success of the NOI in the mid-to-late 1950s was the result of three levels of changes at the time: internal, external in the AAIR community, and external in the broader U.S, culture.

New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran's Rivalry

The competing powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to redress and reverse the strategic imbalance and direction of the Middle East’s regional politics. The 1979 Iranian Revolution catapulted these two states into an embittered rivalry. The fall of Saddam Hussein following the 2003 U.S. led invasion, the establishment of a Shi’ite Iraq and the 2011 Arab Uprisings have further inflamed tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia have not confronted each other militarily, but rather have divided the region into two armed camps on the basis of political and religious ideology in seeking regional allies and promulgating sectarianism as they continue to exploit the region’s weak states in a series of proxy wars ranging from conflicts in Iraq to Lebanon. The Saudi-Iranian strategic and geopolitical rivalry is further complicated by a religious and ideological rivalry, as tensions represent two opposing aspirations for Islamic leadership with two vastly differing political systems. The conflict is between Saudi Arabia, representing Sunni Islam via Wahhabism, and Iran, representing Shi’ite Islam through Khomeinism. The nature of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has led many Middle East experts to identify their rivalry as a “New Middle East Cold War.” The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has important implications for regional stability and U.S. national security interests. Therefore, this thesis seeks to address the question: Is a cold war framework applicable when analyzing the Saudi Arabian and Iranian relationship?

Secularism, Sharia, and the Turkish Financial Markets

The financial markets in Turkey provide a laboratory to help resolve these competing views. Islamic law or Sharia contains a number of proscriptions that directly affect financial practices. The payment and receipt of interest is prohibited; so are most kinds of commercial insurance. These interpretations provided the impetus in the Islamic world for the creation of a class of banks that sought to offer Sharia compliant services. The first Islamic Banks in Turkey began operations in the 1980s. Their entry was initially tepid, in no small part because of secularist principles. Islamic financial institutions could not overtly advertise their religious orientation. The country had no “Islamic” banks, only finance houses. They were not Sharia compliant but “interest-free.” Moreover, the government left them in an uncertain regulatory status and subjected them to restrictions on growth. In this environment, the Islamic banks remained a peripheral part of the financial system. With the election of the AKP in 2002, however, the environment for Islamic banks in Turkey changed. Limitations on branch networks and capital raising were lifted. The government removed restrictions on the issuance of Sharia compliant bonds. Officials from the Islamic banks were appointed to the highest levels of government. This Article does several things. First, it examines principles of Islam that affect banking practices, with a particular emphasis on deposit insurance and credit cards. Second, the Article discusses the emergence of secularism in Turkey and the introduction of Islamic banks into the Turkish financial markets. The Article then examine their evolution, with particular emphasis on the changes implemented by the AKP. Finally, the Article examines the impact of these reforms, and what that impact says about Islamic influence in Turkey.