A Transdiagnostic Social Skills Intervention; Using a Structured Story to Teach Children How to Ask a Friend to Play

An (independent samples comparison) controlled study was conducted to assess the efficacy of a novel approach to social skills training for children in a local socialization group at Knippenberg, Patterson & Associates (KPA). The treatment condition involved the combination of a Structured Story (i.e., novel bibliotherapy technique for children with social skills deficits), and a behavioral rehearsal (or role-play) segment, where the children practiced the target social skill featured in the Structure Story. The control group did not receive the Structured Story nor the behavioral rehearsal. Children in both groups engaged in ten-minutes of free play that was videorecorded for later observation and scoring by the principal investigator. Two target behaviors were assessed; asking a friend to play, and duration of joint play between two or more peers. The results did not show significant differences for either target variable between the group that received the novel intervention and the control group. Limitations of the current study and implications for further research are discussed.

High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment

Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment. It is beyond question that some lies – such as perjury or pretending to be a police officer – are not covered by the First Amendment. But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). To date, however, both Supreme Court doctrine and academic commentary has taken for granted that any constitutional protection for lies is purely prophylactic – it protects the liar to avoid chilling truthful speech. This Article is the first to argue, contrary to conventional wisdom, that certain types of lies paradoxically advance the values underlying the First Amendment. Our framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally important insofar as we provide the first comprehensive post-Alvarez look at the wide range of lies that may raise First Amendment issues. Because there was no majority opinion in Alvarez, there is uncertainty about which standard of constitutional scrutiny should apply to protected lies, an issue we examine at length. Moreover, our normative claim is straightforward: when a lie has intrinsic or instrumental value it should be treated differently from other types of lies and warrant the greatest constitutional protection. Specifically, we argue that investigative deceptions – lies used to secure truthful factual information about matters of public concern – deserve the utmost constitutional protection because they advance the underling purposes of free speech: they enhance political discourse, help reveal the truth, and promote individual autonomy. A prototypical investigative deception is the sort of misrepresentation required in order for an undercover journalist, investigator, or activist to gain access to information or images of great political significance that would not be available if the investigator disclosed her reporting or political objectives. Tactical use of such lies have a long history in American journalism and activism, from Upton Sinclair to his modern day heirs. Using the proliferation of anti-whistleblower statutes like Ag Gag laws as an illustrative example, we argue that investigative deceptions are a category of high value lies that ought to receive rigorous protection under the First Amendment. At the same time, we recognize that not all lies are alike and that in other areas, the government regulation of lies serves legitimate interests. We therefore conclude the Article by drawing some limiting principles to our theory.