Sovereignty and Intervention in the Middle East: From the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Arab Spring

This research provides an institutional explanation of the practices of external intervention in the Arab state system from the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 to the Arab Spring. My explanation consists of two institutional variables: sovereignty and inter-state borders. I examine the changes in regional and international norms of sovereignty and their impact on the practices of external intervention in the Arab state system. I also examine the impact of the level of institutionalization of inter-state borders in the Arab World on the practices of external intervention. I argue that changes in regional and international norms of sovereignty and changes in the level of institutionalization of inter-state borders have constituted the significant variation over time in both the frequency and type of external intervention in the Arab state system from 1922 to the present. My institutional explanation and findings seriously challenge the traditional accounts of sovereignty and intervention in the Arab World, including the cultural perspectives that emphasize the conflict between sovereignty, Arabism, and Islam, the constructivist accounts that emphasize the regional norm of pan-Arabism, the comparative politics explanations that focus on the domestic material power of the Arab state, the post-colonial perspectives that emphasize the artificiality of the Arab state, and the realist accounts that focus on great powers and the regional distribution of power in the Middle East. This research also contributes to International Relations Theory. I construct a new analytical framework to study the relations between sovereignty, borders, and intervention, combining theoretical elements from the fields of Role Theory, Social Constructivism, and Institutionalization. Methodologically, this research includes both quantitative and qualitative analysis. I conduct content analysis of official documents of Arab states and the Arab League, Arabic press documents, and Arab political thought. I also utilize quantitative data sets on international intervention.

Role Expectations and State Socialization: Germany's Rediscovery of the Use of Force 1990-1995

This dissertation engages the question of why German political elites accepted the use of force during the 1990s and started to commit the country's armed forces to multilateral peacekeeping missions. Previous governments of the Federal Republic had opposed foreign deployment of the military and Germany was characterized by a unique strategic culture in which the efficacy of military force was widely regarded as negative. The rediscovery of the use of force constituted a significant reorientation of German security policy with potentially profound implications for international relations. I use social role theory to explain Germany's security policy reorientation. I argue that political elites shared a national role conception of their country as a dependable and reliable ally. Role expectations of the international security environment changed as a result of a general shift to multilateral intervention as means to address emerging security problems after the Cold War. Germany's resistance to the use of force was viewed as inappropriate conduct for a power possessing the economic and military wherewithal of the Federal Republic. Elites from allied countries exerted social pressure to have Germany contribute commensurate with capabilities. German political elites adapted role behavior in response to external expectations in an effort to preserve the national role conception of a dependable and reliable ally. Security policy reorientation to maintain Germany's national role conception was pursued by conservative elites who acted as 'role entrepreneurs'. CDU/CSU politicians initiated a process of role adaptation to include the use of force for non-defensive missions. They persuaded Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green party politicians that the maintenance of the country's role conception necessitated a reorientation in security policy to accommodate the changes in the security environment.

Ambivalent Sovereignty

Ambivalent Sovereignty inquires into the subject of political realism. This subject, sovereign authority, appears to have a dual foundation. It appears divided against itself, but how can realism nonetheless observe legitimate modes of sovereignty emerge? Against the liberal idea that a "synthesis" of both material-coercive and ideal-persuasive powers should be accomplished, within the world of international relations, realism gives meaning to a structural type of state power that is also constitutionally and legitimately dividing itself--against itself. Machiavelli but particularly also other realists such as Hannah Arendt, Max Weber, and Aristotle are being reinterpreted to demonstrate why each state's ultimate authority may symbiotically emerge from its self-divisions, rather than from one synthetic unity. Whereas liberal theorists, from Montesquieu to John Rawls and Alexander Wendt, err too far in assuming the presence of the state's monistic authority, the realist theorists further advance an answer to how sovereign states may begin to both recognize and include only the most-legitimate manifestations of their common dualist authority. Ambivalent Sovereignty is relevant in this sense as it transcends-and-yet-includes these common dualities: freedom/necessity; emergence/causation; self-organization/power structures.

Everyday Indivisibility: How Exclusive Religious Practices Explain Variation in Subnational Violence Outcomes

This project explores the puzzle of religious violence variation. Religious actors initiate conflict at a higher rate than their secular counterparts, last longer, are more deadly, and are less prone to negotiated termination. Yet the legacy of religious peacemakers on the reduction of violence is undeniable. Under what conditions does religion contribute to escalated violence and under what conditions does it contribute to peace? I argue that more intense everyday practices of group members, or high levels of orthopraxy, create dispositional indivisibilities that make violence a natural alternative to bargaining. Subnational armed groups with members whose practices are exclusive and isolating bind together through ritual practice, limit the acceptable decisions of leaders, and have prolonged timeframes, all of which result in higher levels of intensity, intransigence and resolve during violent conflict. The theory challenges both instrumentalist and constructivist understandings of social identity and violence. To support this argument, I construct an original cross-national data-set that employs ethnographic data on micro-level religious practices for 724 subnational armed groups in both civil wars and terror campaigns. Using this data, I build an explanatory “religious practice index” for each observation and examine its relationship with conflict outcomes. Findings suggest that exclusive practice groups fight significantly longer with more intensity and negotiate less. I also apply the practice model to qualitative cases. Fieldwork in the West Bank and Sierra Leone reveals that groups with more exclusive religious practicing membership are principle contributors to violence, whereas those with inclusive practices can contribute to peace. The project concludes with a discussion about several avenues for future research and identifies the practical policy applications to better identify and combat religious extremism.