Ambivalent Sovereignty

Ambivalent Sovereignty inquires into the subject of political realism. This subject, sovereign authority, appears to have a dual foundation. It appears divided against itself, but how can realism nonetheless observe legitimate modes of sovereignty emerge? Against the liberal idea that a "synthesis" of both material-coercive and ideal-persuasive powers should be accomplished, within the world of international relations, realism gives meaning to a structural type of state power that is also constitutionally and legitimately dividing itself--against itself. Machiavelli but particularly also other realists such as Hannah Arendt, Max Weber, and Aristotle are being reinterpreted to demonstrate why each state's ultimate authority may symbiotically emerge from its self-divisions, rather than from one synthetic unity. Whereas liberal theorists, from Montesquieu to John Rawls and Alexander Wendt, err too far in assuming the presence of the state's monistic authority, the realist theorists further advance an answer to how sovereign states may begin to both recognize and include only the most-legitimate manifestations of their common dualist authority. Ambivalent Sovereignty is relevant in this sense as it transcends-and-yet-includes these common dualities: freedom/necessity; emergence/causation; self-organization/power structures.

Role Expectations and State Socialization: Germany's Rediscovery of the Use of Force 1990-1995

This dissertation engages the question of why German political elites accepted the use of force during the 1990s and started to commit the country's armed forces to multilateral peacekeeping missions. Previous governments of the Federal Republic had opposed foreign deployment of the military and Germany was characterized by a unique strategic culture in which the efficacy of military force was widely regarded as negative. The rediscovery of the use of force constituted a significant reorientation of German security policy with potentially profound implications for international relations. I use social role theory to explain Germany's security policy reorientation. I argue that political elites shared a national role conception of their country as a dependable and reliable ally. Role expectations of the international security environment changed as a result of a general shift to multilateral intervention as means to address emerging security problems after the Cold War. Germany's resistance to the use of force was viewed as inappropriate conduct for a power possessing the economic and military wherewithal of the Federal Republic. Elites from allied countries exerted social pressure to have Germany contribute commensurate with capabilities. German political elites adapted role behavior in response to external expectations in an effort to preserve the national role conception of a dependable and reliable ally. Security policy reorientation to maintain Germany's national role conception was pursued by conservative elites who acted as 'role entrepreneurs'. CDU/CSU politicians initiated a process of role adaptation to include the use of force for non-defensive missions. They persuaded Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green party politicians that the maintenance of the country's role conception necessitated a reorientation in security policy to accommodate the changes in the security environment.