The Effects of Father Absence Due to Divorce: A Systems Interpretation.

In American society, the incidence of divorce continues to rise. In 1974, the estimate was that 40% of all new marriages would end in divorce. When children are involved, the mother usually regains custody. Although the number of children of divorce living with their fathers is increasing, it is still a small percent. In addition, the rate of remarriages is lower when children are involved (Hetherington.et al.,1977). Consequently, a large number of children are being raised in father-absent homes, and indications are that the numbers are increasing. A recent Denver Post article predicted that 50% of all children now being born will spend some of their childhood in a single-parent home. In terms of frequency, the father-absent family is becoming quite common, even "normal," yet it often continues to be considered a "broken" home and, when compared to the two-parent family, an inadequate structure in which to raise healthy children. Since father-absent families are so common these days, this opinion is in need of review.This paper will present a review of the father absence research in three areas: sex role development, cognitive development and personality development. The role of moderator variables will be discussed. And, finally,an open systems model will be proposed as a vehicle to better understand the effects of father absence and as a guide for future research.

The Future Direction of Delaware Law (Including a Brief Exegesis on Fee Shifting Bylaws)

Delaware sets the governance standards for most public companies. The ability to attract corporations could not be explained solely by the existence of a favorable statutory regime. Delaware was not invariably the first or the only state to implement management friendly provisions. Given the interpretive gaps in the statute and the critical importance of the common law in the governance process, courts played an outsized role in setting legal standards. The management friendly nature of the Delaware courts contributed significantly to the state’s attraction to public corporations. A current example of a management friendly trend in the case law had seen the recent decisions setting out the board’s authority to adopt bylaws under Section 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), particularly those involving the shifting of fees in litigation against the corporation or its directors. The DGCL allows bylaws that address “the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” The broad parameters are, however, subject to limits. Bylaws cannot be inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation or “the law.” Law includes the common law. The Delaware courts have used the limitations imposed by “the law” to severely restrict the reach of shareholder inspired bylaws. The courts have not used the same principles to impose similar restraints on bylaws adopted by the board of directors. This can be seen with respect to bylaws that restrict or even eliminate the right of shareholders to bring actions against management and the corporation. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund the court approved a fee shifting bylaw that had littl relationship to the internal affairs of the corporation. The decision upheld the bylaw as facially valid.The decision ignored a number of obvious legal infirmities. Among other things, the decision did not adequately address the requirement in Section 109(b) that bylaws be consistent with “the law.” The decision obliquely acknowledged that the provisions would “by their nature, deter litigation” but otherwise made no effort to assess the impact of this deterrence on shareholders causes of action. The provision in fact had the practical effect of restricting, if not eliminating, litigation rights granted by the DGCL and the common law. Perhaps most significantly, however, the bylaws significantly limited common law rights of shareholders to bring actions against the corporation and the board. Given the high dismissal rates for these actions, fee shifting bylaws imposed a meaningful risk of liability on plaintiffs. Moreover, because judgments in derivative suits were paid to the corporation, shareholders serving as plaintiffs confronted the risk of liability without any offsetting direct benefit. By preventing suits in this area, the bylaw effectively insulated the behavior of boards from legal challenge. The ATP decision was poorly reasoned and overstepped acceptable boundaries. The management friendly decision threatened the preeminent role of Delaware in the development of corporate law. The decision raised the specter of federal intervention and the potential for meaningful competition from the states. Because the opinion examined the bylaw in the context of non-stock companies, the reasoning may remain applicable only to those entities and never make the leap to for-profit stock corporations. Nonetheless, the analysis reflects a management friendly approach that does not adequately take into account the impact of the provision on the rights of shareholders.

Governance and Uncertainty

Government actors create law against a backdrop of uncertainty. Limited information, unpredictable events, and lack of understanding interfere with accurately predicting a legal regime’s costs, benefits, and effects on other legal and social programs and institutions. Does the availability of no-fault divorce increase the number of terminated marriages? Will bulk-collection of telecommunications information about American citizens reveal terrorist plots? Can a sensitive species breed in the presence of oil and gas wells? The answers to these questions are far from clear, but lawmakers must act nonetheless. The problems posed by uncertainty cut across legal fields. Scholars and regulators in a variety of contexts recognize the importance of uncertainty, but no systematic, generally-applicable framework exists for determining how law should account for gaps in information. This Article suggests such a framework and develops a novel typology of strategies for accounting for uncertainty in governance. This typology includes “static law,” as well as three varieties of “dynamic law.” “Static law” is a legal rule initially intended to last in perpetuity. “Dynamic law” is intended to change, and includes: (1) durational regulation, or fixed legal rules with periodic opportunities for amendment or repeal; (2) adaptive regulation, or malleable legal rules with procedural mechanisms allowing rules to change; and (3) contingent regulation, or malleable legal rules with triggering mechanisms to substantively change to the rules. Each of these strategies, alone or in combination, may best address the uncertainty inherent in a particular lawmaking effort. This Article provides a diagnostic framework that lawmakers can use to identify optimal strategies. Ultimately, this approach to uncertainty yields immediate practical benefits by enabling lawmakers to better structure governance.

An Evaluation of Applicant Tracking Systems for Recruiting Efficiency

The very purpose of a recruiting software program is to help the management of organizations, primarily the HR department to keep track of the job applications. An applicant tracking system can reduce an organization's overall recruitment cost, increase productivity, and raise the level of satisfaction due to faster and better completion of transactions and services. This project analyzes four software providers to discover an applicant tracking system which best suits an organization's recruiting needs. The capstone also highlights that great success an organization can be achieved by significantly improving the delivery of its recruiting services to employees, managers and applicants. The adoption of a well managed applicant tracking system can support this goal.