China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.

Chinese Intellectuals and China`s Policy toward Japan

This dissertation aims at integrating two scholarships: state-society relation studies and Chinese foreign policy analysis. I created Two-level Perception Gap Model to analyze different intellectual groups' relations with party-state by confirming Chinese intellectuals play a role in CFP making in general, China's Japan policy in particular. This model is an alternative approach, instead of conventional wisdom patron-client approach, to explain and analyze the pluralized intellectual-state relations in China. This model first analyzed the role of two intellectual groups, namely think tank scholars and popular nationalist, in China's Japan policy making, and then based on these analyses it explains the interactional patterns between these two intellectual groups and party-state. I used three case studies, which represented different types of issue, Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, to examine this model. First, I examined think tank scholar groups and the extent they influenced "core interest issue and sensitive issue (Issue 1)," Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, and their international patterns with party-state. Chapter 3 compares the responses of Chinese officials to the changes in the defense policy of Japan to the analyses from the think tank scholars. As the model assumes, results show that think tank scholars' analyses are consistent with China's policy position; nevertheless, it is difficult to confirm their analyses have influence on Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. Based on the analysis of journal articles, most articles do not provide policy suggestions or simply provide suggestions that do not deviate from the policy. As Gu's theory of pluralist institutionalism and my hypothesis points out, most think tank scholars are establishment intellectuals so they tend to be self-disciplined. Second, this model provide a new concept "patriotic dilemma" for analyzing the challenge and constraints brought by popular nationalist discourses and public mobilization to Chinese foreign policy decision makers. Chapter 4 investigated the cases study of the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, defined as "major/minor interest issue/ sensitive issue (Issue 3)," and the discourses from the popular nationalist, mainly focusing on anti-Japanese activists. The chapter also observes their influence on nationalist public opinions and analyzes how the nationalist public opinions constrain the policy choices among decision makers. Results strongly supported the hypothesis of patriotic dilemma that, although the popular nationalist group and public opinions constrained the policy choices of Chinese decision makers in the short term, they were unable to change the fundamental policy direction. Third, chapter 5 also focuses on anti-Japanese activists and examines the model with the case of the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The result supported that hypothesis that China's policy change was not because of the influence from popular nationalist's discourses or public opinions but because of the change of priority of this issue, from major/minor interest issue to core interest issue. These two chapters also indicate that the patron-client model is unable to describe the popular nationalist. An alternative approach, such as the concept "patriotic dilemma" is needed to describe the relations between the popular nationalist and the government.