China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.

Monetary Effervescence: A Sociological Theory of Religion Applied to Money

This project attempts to answer the question "What holds the construction of money together?" by asserting that it is money's religious nature which provides the moral compulsion for people to use, and continue to uphold, money as a socially constructed concept. This project is primarily descriptive and focuses on the religious nature of money by employing a sociological theory of religion in viewing money as a technical concept. This is an interdisciplinary work between religious studies, economics, and sociology and draws heavily from Emile Durkheim's 'The Elementary Forms of Religious Life' as well as work related to heterodox theories of money developed by Geoffrey Ingham, A. Mitchell Innes, and David Graeber. Two new concepts are developed: the idea of monetary sacrality and monetary effervescence, both of which serve to recharge the religious saliency of money. By developing the concept of monetary sacrality, this project shows how money acts to interpret our economic relations while also obfuscating complex power dynamics in society, making them seem naturally occurring and unchangeable. The project also shows how our contemporary fractional reserve banking system contributes to money's collective effervescence and serves to animate economic acting within a monetary network. The project concludes by outlining multiple implications for religious studies, economics, sociology, and central banking.