Women and Performance in Corporate America

Women and Performance in Corporate America The glass ceiling has been shattered. Women like Indra Nooyi, the CEO of PepsiCo.; Angela Braly, the CEO of Wellpoint; and Patricia Woertz, the CEO of Archer Daniels Midland, are proof that women can achieve top leadership positions in corporate America. However, the scarcity of female leaders occupying the top ranks of corporate America, and the significant wage gap between men and women, suggest that there are significant complications along the path toward success for women in the corporate world.The data show that a disproportionately small number of women are making it to top leadership positions in corporate America. According to the US Department of Labor, in 2007 women accounted for 46% of the total work force, and 51 % of all workers in management, professional, and related occupations. Women outnumbered men in occupations including financial managers, human resource managers, education administrators, medical and health service managers, accountants and auditors, budget analysts, and property, real estate, and social and community association managers (US Department of Labor, 2007). However, women hold only 15.2% of board director positions, 15.7% of corporate officer positions, and 6.2% of top earner positions (Catalyst, 2009b). Additionally, according to a 2008 Corporate Library survey, only 2.6% of Fortune 500 companies currently have female CEOs (as cited in Jones, 2009).The data also show that women earn less than men in the work force. The US Department of Labor found that women working full time in 2007 made only 80% of the salaries of men (US Department of Labor, 2008). Studies designed to control for factors other than gender have not been able to account for the wage gap between men and women (Eagly & Carli, 2007, US Government Accountability Office, 2003). Even among CEO's of fortune 500 companies, female CEO's make only 85% of the salaries of male CEO's (Jones, 2009).

Comment Letter: The NYSE and the End of the Structural Separation between Regulatory and Commercial Interests of the Exchange

The NYSE transformed into a for profit entity in 2006. As part of the approval process, the NYSE agreed to structurally separate the regulatory function from the business function. In doing so, the NYSE created NYSE Regulation, a non-profit with an independent board, to handle most regulatory matters. During the comment period, a spirited debate arose over the ability of a for profit company to carry out a regulatory mission. Some suggested that the regulatory function was incompatible with a "for profit" motive and that NYSE Regulation should be spun off. Others accepted the proposed structure but called for additional changes designed to reduce the possible influence of the public holding company over the regulatory function. In the end, the SEC approved the structure but with a number of prophylactic safeguards including the requirement that NYSE Regulation have a board consisting of all independent directors (save the CEO) and that directors from the for profit holding company could not make up a majority of the board. More recently, however, the NYSE has proposed to end the structural separation of the two functions and instead put in place a functional separation. The proposal would result in the termination of the delegation agreement between the Exchange and NYSE Regulation and the creation of both a Regulatory Oversight Committee of the Board of Directors of the Exchange and the creation of a Chief Regulatory Officer. This letter examines the history of the separation of the two functions and critiques the NYSE's proposal.