Citation Methodologies in Eusebius’ Historia ecclesiastica and Other Ancient Historiography

This dissertation examines ancient historiographic citation methodologies in light of Mikhail Bakhtin’s dichotomy between polyphony and monologization. In particular, this dissertation argues that Eusebius of Caesarea’s Historia ecclesiastica (HE) abandons the monologic citation methodology typical of previous Greek and Hellenistic historiography and introduces a polyphonic citation methodology that influences subsequent late-ancient Christian historiography to varying degrees. Whereas Pre-Eusebian Greek and Hellenistic historiographers typically use citations to support the single authorial consciousness of the historiographer, Eusebius uses citations to counterbalance his own shortcomings as a witness to past events. Eusebius allows his citations to retain their own voice, even when they conflict with his. The result is a narrative that transcends the point of view of any single individual and makes multiple witnesses, including the narrator, available to the reader. Post-Eusebian late-ancient Christian historiographers exhibit the influence of Eusebius’ innovation, but they are not as intentional as Eusebius in their use of citation methodologies. Many subsequent Christian historiographers use both monologic and polyphonic citation methodologies. Their tendency to follow Eusebius’ practice of citing numerous lengthy citations sometimes emphasizes points of view that oppose the author’s point of view. When an opposing viewpoint surfaces in enough citations, a polyphonic citation methodology emerges. The reader holds the two different narrative strands in tension as the author continues to give voice to opposing viewpoints. After illustrating the citation methodologies with passages from numerous Greek, Hellenistic, and late ancient Christian historiographers, this dissertation concludes with a short computational analysis that uses natural language processing to reveal some broad trends that highlight the previous findings and suggest a possibility for future research.

New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran's Rivalry

The competing powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to redress and reverse the strategic imbalance and direction of the Middle East’s regional politics. The 1979 Iranian Revolution catapulted these two states into an embittered rivalry. The fall of Saddam Hussein following the 2003 U.S. led invasion, the establishment of a Shi’ite Iraq and the 2011 Arab Uprisings have further inflamed tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia have not confronted each other militarily, but rather have divided the region into two armed camps on the basis of political and religious ideology in seeking regional allies and promulgating sectarianism as they continue to exploit the region’s weak states in a series of proxy wars ranging from conflicts in Iraq to Lebanon. The Saudi-Iranian strategic and geopolitical rivalry is further complicated by a religious and ideological rivalry, as tensions represent two opposing aspirations for Islamic leadership with two vastly differing political systems. The conflict is between Saudi Arabia, representing Sunni Islam via Wahhabism, and Iran, representing Shi’ite Islam through Khomeinism. The nature of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has led many Middle East experts to identify their rivalry as a “New Middle East Cold War.” The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has important implications for regional stability and U.S. national security interests. Therefore, this thesis seeks to address the question: Is a cold war framework applicable when analyzing the Saudi Arabian and Iranian relationship?

China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.