Group Dynamics in Sex Offender Treatment Involving Individuals with Personality Disorders

This qualitative investigation primarily employing a phenomenological perspective and psychoanalytic interview approach intends to provide contextual understanding of group dynamics in sex offender treatment involving individuals with strong features of personality disorders or Axis II psychopathology according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (4 ed., text rev.; DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Of note, this study particularly focuses on the cluster B type (Narcissistic, Borderline, Histrionic, and Antisocial Personality Disorders), based on the assumption that this type is more interpersonally operational in its nature. The present study is based on semi-structured interviews of three clinicians who arecurrently providing group treatment for sex offenders. The interview was designed to elicit the participants' clinical observations of group dynamics involving group members with features of the Axis II, Cluster B type. In this study, 11 therapeutic factors postulated by Yalom (2005) were utilized to qualitatively investigate group dynamics. Analyses of qualitative data highlighted how group members with features of the Axis II, Cluster B type may distinctively affect group dynamics. Based on the results, group members with Axis II diagnoses, as reported bythe therapists who responded to this study, were observed to present with altruistic behaviors in group. In addition, motivation appeared to be one of the most influential factors in promoting and maintaining therapeutic group behaviors. Group members with antisocial features appeared to present with low motivation for treatment, and individualswith a pervasive history of criminal institutionalization seemed more prone to disengagement in group. Individuals with borderline and histrionic traits seemed to be interpersonally oriented and affectively engaged in group process. Persons with a narcissistic tendency also appeared to be interpersonally invested and showed altruistic behaviors, yet the importance of confirming their superiority seemed to outweigh the need for acceptance or approval from other group members. As briefly discussed above, the qualitative analyses of the current data showed that individuals with Axis II disorders, Cluster B type uniquely affect group dynamics, which suggest clinical considerations foreffective treatment planning, maintenance, and outcomes.

Setting Congress Up to Fail

In Shelby County v. Holder the Supreme Court invalidated key provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 based on Congress’s failure to justify the formula used to determine which jurisdictions would be subject to the Act’s pre-clearance requirement of submitting all changes to voting procedures to the Justice Department for prior approval. This short essay explores one problematic feature of the Court’s analysis: its refusal to consider the legislative record as adequate because it was created to justify the coverage formula after the fact, rather than to facilitate deliberation on the coverage formula before a decision had been made. This reasoning essentially imports from administrative law a rule called the Chenery principle, and as this essay explains, it does so without justification. The differences between administrative and legislative decision making processes compel different treatment by the courts, and treating legislative records like administrative ones, in essence, asks of Congress something it is institutionally ill-equipped to perform. It sets Congress up to fail.

Comment Letter: The NYSE and the End of the Structural Separation between Regulatory and Commercial Interests of the Exchange

The NYSE transformed into a for profit entity in 2006. As part of the approval process, the NYSE agreed to structurally separate the regulatory function from the business function. In doing so, the NYSE created NYSE Regulation, a non-profit with an independent board, to handle most regulatory matters. During the comment period, a spirited debate arose over the ability of a for profit company to carry out a regulatory mission. Some suggested that the regulatory function was incompatible with a "for profit" motive and that NYSE Regulation should be spun off. Others accepted the proposed structure but called for additional changes designed to reduce the possible influence of the public holding company over the regulatory function. In the end, the SEC approved the structure but with a number of prophylactic safeguards including the requirement that NYSE Regulation have a board consisting of all independent directors (save the CEO) and that directors from the for profit holding company could not make up a majority of the board. More recently, however, the NYSE has proposed to end the structural separation of the two functions and instead put in place a functional separation. The proposal would result in the termination of the delegation agreement between the Exchange and NYSE Regulation and the creation of both a Regulatory Oversight Committee of the Board of Directors of the Exchange and the creation of a Chief Regulatory Officer. This letter examines the history of the separation of the two functions and critiques the NYSE's proposal.