Party Members’ Preferences and the Changing Nature of Party Representation: Does Representation Change when Parties become Mini-Republics?

Giovanni Sartori famously wrote that political parties do not need to be mini-republics, yet today parties in many parliamentary democracies are moving in this direction by giving their members direct votes over important decisions, including selecting party leaders and settling policy issues. This paper explores some of the implications of these changes. It asks whether the addition of membership rights affects the types of members who are attracted: do we find a bigger gap between the preferences of party members and of party voters in parties that are more plebiscitary, as literature on members' motivations might lead us to expect? The paper examines this question both cross-sectionally and longitudinally using opinion data from the European Social Survey and newly-available party organizational data from the Political Party Database project.

One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.