The diencephalic syndrome in infants: A review in relation to optic nerve glioma

A study of the diencephalic syndrome in cases so far collected from the literature was carried out on the clinical, macroscopic and histological brain findings found recorded in, respectively, 29, 25 and 34 cases. For comparison, 3 further cases with this syn- drome were described, in which a diagnosis of optic nerve glioma could be made. The review of the 39 cases with the diencephalic syndrome has shown that in 90°/o of these patients an extensive glioma of the 3rd ventricle had been present. 70% of these patients had additional glioma of optic nerves and/or chiasm with an equal amount of infants having diminished visual acuity in one or both eyes. From these, so far unreported, findings, strong suggestive evidence was thus presented that the ‘diencephalic syndrome’ described in infants was indeed a mor¬bid entity, namely, a hypothalamo-optic glioma. The further question whether this brain tumour was a primary optic nerve rather than a primary diencephalic glioma could presently not be firmly answered from the reviewed data of the literature. © 1972 S. Karger AG, Basel.

Democratic Peace and Electoral Accountability

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autoc- racies, very rarely fight each other. We examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two po- litical regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can deter democratic leaders from engaging in military con- flicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, implying that democracies in which the executives are subject to term limits should be more conflict prone. To assess the validity of our predictions, we construct a large dataset on countries with executive term limits. Our analysis of inter-state conflicts for the 1816-2001 period suggests that electoral incentives are indeed behind the democratic peace phenomenon: while democratic dyads are in general less likely to be involved in conflicts than any other dyads, this result does not hold for democracies in which the executive faces binding term limits; moreover, the dispute patterns of democracies with term limits depend on whether the executive is in the last or penultimate mandate.