Patient-centred screening for primary immunodeficiency: a multi-stage diagnostic protocol designed for non-immunologists.

Efficient early identification of primary immunodeficiency disease (PID) is important for prognosis, but is not an easy task for non-immunologists. The Clinical Working Party of the European Society for Immunodeficiencies (ESID) has composed a multi-stage diagnostic protocol that is based on expert opinion, in order to increase the awareness of PID among doctors working in different fields. The protocol starts from the clinical presentation of the patient; immunological skills are not needed for its use. The multi-stage design allows cost-effective screening for PID within the large pool of potential cases in all hospitals in the early phases, while more expensive tests are reserved for definitive classification in collaboration with an immunologist at a later stage. Although many PIDs present in childhood, others may present at any age. The protocols presented here are therefore aimed at both adult physicians and paediatricians. While designed for use throughout Europe, there will be national differences which may make modification of this generic algorithm necessary.

One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.