A stylized software model to explore the free market equality/efficiency tradeoff

This paper provides an agent-based software exploration of the wellknown free market efficiency/equality trade-off. Our study simulates the interaction of agents producing, trading and consuming goods in the presence of different market structures, and looks at how efficient the producers/consumers mapping turn out to be as well as the resulting distribution of welfare among agents at the end of an arbitrarily large number of iterations. Two market mechanisms are compared: the competitive market (a double auction market in which agents outbid each other in order to buy and sell products) and the random one (in which products are allocated randomly). Our results confirm that the superior efficiency of the competitive market (an effective and never stopping producers/consumers mapping and a superior aggregative welfare) comes at a very high price in terms of inequality (above all when severe budget constraints are in play).

An Afriat theorem for the collective model of household consumption

We provide a nonparametric 'revealed preference’ characterization of rational household behavior in terms of the collective consumption model, while accounting for general (possibly non-convex) individual preferences. We establish a Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference (CARP), which provides a necessary and sufficient condition for data consistency with collective rationality. Our main result takes the form of a ‘collective’ version of the Afriat Theorem for rational behavior in terms of the unitary model. This theorem has some interesting implications. With only a finite set of observations, the nature of consumption externalities (positive or negative) in the intra-household allocation process is non-testable. The same non-testability conclusion holds for privateness (with or without externalities) or publicness of consumption. By contrast, concavity of individual utility functions (representing convex preferences) turns out to be testable. In addition, monotonicity is testable for the model that assumes all household consumption is public.