Influence of the perception of discrimination on women's work motivation

Nowadays, despite anti-discrimination policies, women suffer frequently from a lack of consideration from their male colleagues, altering their well-being and motivation to work. More precisely, perceived personal or groupal discrimination, could have a distinct influence on work motivation. Previous studies showed that the impact on women varies in function of the type of perceived discrimination (Bourguignon et al. 2006). Based on the self-categorization and the social identity theory, work motivation is differently structured as if employees categorized themselves as individuals or as part of a group. As a result, a different impact from personal and group discrimination on work motivation is expected. Moreover, it has been proved that typical men behavior is heavily associated with competence compared to women behavior (Marchand, Saint-Charles & Corbeil, 2007). Therefore, it is hypothesized that women with more masculine traits will suffer from less perceived discrimination, and work motivation. An online survey was created in order to collect data over work motivation, perceived personal and group discrimination. The respondents were also questioned on typical men and women behavior to determine their gender-conformity. To test our hypotheses, data were collected from 57 women stemming from the labour force, aged from 21 to 63 years old. Results indicate that perceived personal discrimination was negatively related to work motivation and that perceived group discrimination was negatively correlated with masculine behavior. Thereby, our study enhances the importance of work environment, and especially discrimination, on work motivation. This research also corroborates the self-categorization and the social identity theory framework to study these issues.

Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium

We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one’s own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy. Given separability, it is impossible to identify other-regarding preferences from market behavior: agents be- have as if they had classical preferences that depend only on own consumption in competitive equilibrium. If preferences, in addition, depend only on the final allocation of consumption in society, the Sec- ond Welfare Theorem holds as long as an increase in resources can be distributed such that all agents are better off. Nevertheless, the First Welfare Theorem generally does not hold. Allowing agents to care about their own consumption and the distribution of consump- tion possibilities in the economy, we provide a condition under which agents have no incentive to make direct transfers, and show that this condition implies that competitive equilibria are efficient given prices.