3 resultados para OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
em DI-fusion - The institutional repository of Université Libre de Bruxelles
Resumo:
Corporate bond appeared early in 1992-1994 in Vietnamese capital markets. However, it is still not popular to both business sector and academic circle. This paper explores different dimensions of Vietnamese corporate bond market using a unique, and perhaps, most complete dataset. State not only intervenes in the bond markets with its powerful budget and policies but also competes directly with enterprises. The dominance of SOEs and large corporations also prevents SMEs from this debt financing vehicle. Whenever a convertible term is available, bondholders are more willing to accept lower fixed income payoff. But they would not likely stick to it. On one hand, prospective bondholders could value the holdings of equity when realized favorably ex ante. On the other hand, the applicable coupon rate for such bond could turn out negative inflationadjusted payoff when tight monetary policy is exercised and the corresponding equity holding turns out valueless, ex post. Given the weak primary market and virtually nonexistent secondary market, the corporate bond market in Vietnam reflects our perception of the relationship-based and rent-seeking behavior in the financial markets. For the corporate bonds to really work, they critically need a higher level of liquidity to become truly tradable financial assets.
Resumo:
This study investigates a longitudinal dataset consisting of financial and operational data from 37 listed companies listed on Vietnamese stock market, covering the period 2004-13. By performing three main types of regression analysis - pooled OLS, fixed-effect and random-effect regressions - the investigation finds mixed results on the relationships between operational scales, sources of finance and firms' performance, depending on the choice of analytical model and use of independent/dependent variables. In most situation, fixed-effect models appear to be preferable, providing for reasonably consistent results. Toward the end, the paper offers some further explanation about the obtained insights, which reflect the nature of a business environment of a transition economy and an emerging market.
Resumo:
We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms.In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate their firms, trading off the pecuniary benefits of coordinating production decisions with the private benefits of operating in their preferred ways. The price of output is a crucial determinant of this choice, since it affects the size of the pecuniary benefits. In particular, non-integration is chosen at “low” and “high” prices, while integration occurs at moderate prices. Organizational choices also depend on the terms of trade in supplier markets, which affect the division of surplus between managers. We obtain three main results. First, even when firms do not relocate across countries, the price changes triggered by liberalization of product markets can lead to significant organizational restructuring within countries. Second, the removal of barriers to factor mobility can lead to inefficient reorganization and adversely affect consumers. Third, “deep integration” — the liberalization of both product and factor markets — leads to the convergence of organizational design across countries.