Empirical Evidence on Relationships between Ex Ante Innovation Pursuit and Post-M&A Performance in the Vietnamese M&A Industry, 2005-2012

This research aims to communicate new results of empirical investigations to learn about the relationship between determination of controlling an acquired firm’s capital, assets and brand versus its capability of innovation and ex post performance of the rising Vietnamese M&A industry in the 2005-2012 period. The analysis employs a categorical data sample, consisting of 212 M&A cases reported by various information sources, and performs a number of logistic regressions with significant results as follows. Firstly, the overall relationship between pre-M&A pursuit’s determination on acquiring resources and performance of the post-M&A performance is found significant. There exist profound effects of a ‘size matters’ strategy in M&A ex post performance. When there is an overwhelming ‘resources acquiring’ strategy, the innovation factor’s explanatory power becomes negligible. Secondly, for negative performance of post-M&A operations, the emphasis on both capital base and asset size, and the brand value at the time of the M&A pursuit is the major explanation in the post-M&A period. So does the absence of innovation as a goal in the pre-M&A period. These two insights together are useful in careful M&A planning. Lastly, expensive pre-M&A expenditures tend to adversely affect the post-M&A performance. As a general conclusion, this study shows that innovation can be an important factor to pursue in M&A transitions, together with the need to emphasize and find capable and willing human capital, rather than a capital base (equity or debt) and existing values of the acquired brands.

One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.