The Vietnam's Transition Economy and Its Fledgling Financial Markets: 1986-2003

In this paper, we analyze the context of Vietnam’s economic standings in the reform period. The first section embarks on most remarkable factors, which promote the development of financial markets are: (i) Doi Moi policies in 1986 unleash ‘productive powers’. Real GDP growth, and key economic indicators improve. The economy truly departs from the old-style command economy; (ii) FDI component is present in the economy as sine qua non; a crucial growth engine, forming part of the financial markets, planting the ‘seeds’ for its growth; and (iii) the private economy is both the result and cause of the reform. Its growth is steady. Today, it represents a powerhouse, and helps form part of the genuine financial economy. A few noteworthy points found in the next section are: (i) No evidence of financial markets existence was found before Doi Moi. The reform has generated a bulk of private-sector financial companies. New developments have roots in the 1992-amended constitution (x3.2); (ii) The need to reform the financial started with the domino collapse of credit cooperatives in early 1990s. More stress is caused by the ‘blow’ of banking deficiency in late 1990s; and (iii) Laws on SBV and credit institutions, and the launch of the stock market are bold steps. Besides, the Asian financial turmoil forces the economy to reaffirm its reform agenda. Our findings also indicate, through empirical evidences, that economic conditions have stabilized throughout the reform, thanks to the contributions of the FDI and private economic sector. Private investment flows continue to be an eminent factor that drives the economy growth.

Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium

We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one’s own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy. Given separability, it is impossible to identify other-regarding preferences from market behavior: agents be- have as if they had classical preferences that depend only on own consumption in competitive equilibrium. If preferences, in addition, depend only on the final allocation of consumption in society, the Sec- ond Welfare Theorem holds as long as an increase in resources can be distributed such that all agents are better off. Nevertheless, the First Welfare Theorem generally does not hold. Allowing agents to care about their own consumption and the distribution of consump- tion possibilities in the economy, we provide a condition under which agents have no incentive to make direct transfers, and show that this condition implies that competitive equilibria are efficient given prices.

Rent-seekers' lost El Dorado: Vietnam's financial turmoil, 2007-2013

In this investigation, we examined 256 cases of financial failure and fraud in Vietnam’s chaotic years from 2007 to 2013. Categorical data analyses suggest that the rent-seeking approach, or resource-based orientation, alone does not help explain the outcome of a business intention while the association between Orientation and Approach is the best-fit predictor. Rampant financial collapse not only increases the cost of funds but also erodes trust in the economy. Entrepreneurship development and creativity capacity building, in light of this, are necessary to improve socio-economic conditions and the environment. In this manuscript, we also introduce intuitive and cognitive factors to predict ex-ante outcome of a financing scheme.

Corporate Bond Market in the Transition Economy of Vietnam, 1990-2010

Corporate bond appeared early in 1992-1994 in Vietnamese capital markets. However, it is still not popular to both business sector and academic circle. This paper explores different dimensions of Vietnamese corporate bond market using a unique, and perhaps, most complete dataset. State not only intervenes in the bond markets with its powerful budget and policies but also competes directly with enterprises. The dominance of SOEs and large corporations also prevents SMEs from this debt financing vehicle. Whenever a convertible term is available, bondholders are more willing to accept lower fixed income payoff. But they would not likely stick to it. On one hand, prospective bondholders could value the holdings of equity when realized favorably ex ante. On the other hand, the applicable coupon rate for such bond could turn out negative inflationadjusted payoff when tight monetary policy is exercised and the corresponding equity holding turns out valueless, ex post. Given the weak primary market and virtually nonexistent secondary market, the corporate bond market in Vietnam reflects our perception of the relationship-based and rent-seeking behavior in the financial markets. For the corporate bonds to really work, they critically need a higher level of liquidity to become truly tradable financial assets.