Trade Liberalization and Organizational Change

We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms.In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate their firms, trading off the pecuniary benefits of coordinating production decisions with the private benefits of operating in their preferred ways. The price of output is a crucial determinant of this choice, since it affects the size of the pecuniary benefits. In particular, non-integration is chosen at “low” and “high” prices, while integration occurs at moderate prices. Organizational choices also depend on the terms of trade in supplier markets, which affect the division of surplus between managers. We obtain three main results. First, even when firms do not relocate across countries, the price changes triggered by liberalization of product markets can lead to significant organizational restructuring within countries. Second, the removal of barriers to factor mobility can lead to inefficient reorganization and adversely affect consumers. Third, “deep integration” — the liberalization of both product and factor markets — leads to the convergence of organizational design across countries.

Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across con- stituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators’ FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.

Operational scales, sources of finance, and firms’ performance: evidence from Vietnamese longitudinal data

This study investigates a longitudinal dataset consisting of financial and operational data from 37 listed companies listed on Vietnamese stock market, covering the period 2004-13. By performing three main types of regression analysis - pooled OLS, fixed-effect and random-effect regressions - the investigation finds mixed results on the relationships between operational scales, sources of finance and firms' performance, depending on the choice of analytical model and use of independent/dependent variables. In most situation, fixed-effect models appear to be preferable, providing for reasonably consistent results. Toward the end, the paper offers some further explanation about the obtained insights, which reflect the nature of a business environment of a transition economy and an emerging market.

A stylized software model to explore the free market equality/efficiency tradeoff

This paper provides an agent-based software exploration of the wellknown free market efficiency/equality trade-off. Our study simulates the interaction of agents producing, trading and consuming goods in the presence of different market structures, and looks at how efficient the producers/consumers mapping turn out to be as well as the resulting distribution of welfare among agents at the end of an arbitrarily large number of iterations. Two market mechanisms are compared: the competitive market (a double auction market in which agents outbid each other in order to buy and sell products) and the random one (in which products are allocated randomly). Our results confirm that the superior efficiency of the competitive market (an effective and never stopping producers/consumers mapping and a superior aggregative welfare) comes at a very high price in terms of inequality (above all when severe budget constraints are in play).