The Vietnam's Transition Economy and Its Fledgling Financial Markets: 1986-2003

In this paper, we analyze the context of Vietnam’s economic standings in the reform period. The first section embarks on most remarkable factors, which promote the development of financial markets are: (i) Doi Moi policies in 1986 unleash ‘productive powers’. Real GDP growth, and key economic indicators improve. The economy truly departs from the old-style command economy; (ii) FDI component is present in the economy as sine qua non; a crucial growth engine, forming part of the financial markets, planting the ‘seeds’ for its growth; and (iii) the private economy is both the result and cause of the reform. Its growth is steady. Today, it represents a powerhouse, and helps form part of the genuine financial economy. A few noteworthy points found in the next section are: (i) No evidence of financial markets existence was found before Doi Moi. The reform has generated a bulk of private-sector financial companies. New developments have roots in the 1992-amended constitution (x3.2); (ii) The need to reform the financial started with the domino collapse of credit cooperatives in early 1990s. More stress is caused by the ‘blow’ of banking deficiency in late 1990s; and (iii) Laws on SBV and credit institutions, and the launch of the stock market are bold steps. Besides, the Asian financial turmoil forces the economy to reaffirm its reform agenda. Our findings also indicate, through empirical evidences, that economic conditions have stabilized throughout the reform, thanks to the contributions of the FDI and private economic sector. Private investment flows continue to be an eminent factor that drives the economy growth.

Essays on Vietnam’s Financial Reforms: Foreign Exchange Statistics and Evidence of Long-Run Equilibrium

In this paper, we examine exchange rates in Vietnam’s transitional economy. Evidence of long-run equilibrium are established in most cases through a single co-integrating vector among endogenous variables that determine the real exchange rates. This supports relative PPP in which ECT of the system can be combined linearly into a stationary process, reducing deviation from PPP in the long run. Restricted coefficient vectors ß’ = (1, 1, -1) for real exchange rates of currencies in question are not rejected. This empirics of relative PPP adds to found evidences by many researchers, including Flre et al. (1999), Lee (1999), Johnson (1990), Culver and Papell (1999), Cuddington and Liang (2001). Instead of testing for different time series on a common base currency, we use different base currencies (USD, GBP, JPY and EUR). By doing so we want to know the whether theory may posit significant differences against one currency? We have found consensus, given inevitable technical differences, even with smallerdata sample for EUR. Speeds of convergence to PPP and adjustment are faster compared to results from other researches for developed economies, using both observed and bootstrapped HL measures. Perhaps, a better explanation is the adjustment from hyperinflation period, after which the theory indicates that adjusting process actually accelerates. We observe that deviation appears to have been large in early stages of the reform, mostly overvaluation. Over time, its correction took place leading significant deviations to gradually disappear.