Resources, experience and perseverance in entrepreneurs' perceived likelihood of success in an emerging economy

This paper introduces new results obtained from a statistical investigation into a 3071-observation data set collected from a Vietnamese nationwide entrepreneurship survey. From established relationships, such factors as preparedness, financial resources and participation in social networks are confirmed to have significant effects on entrepreneurial decisions. Entrepreneurs, both financially constrained and unconstrained, who have a business plan tend to start their entrepreneurial ventures earlier. Also, financial constraints have a profound impact on the entrepreneurial decisions. When perceiving the likelihood of success to be high, an entrepreneur shows the tendency for prompt action on business ideas. But when seeing the risk of prolonging the waiting time to first revenue, a prospective entrepreneur would be more likely to wait for more favorable conditions despite the vagueness of "favorable". Additionally, empirical computations indicate that there is a 41.3% probability that an extant entrepreneur who is generating revenue sees high chance of success. Past work and entrepreneurial experiences also have positive impacts on both the entrepreneurial decisions and perceived chance of success.

Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across con- stituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators’ FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.