Be rich or don’t be sick: Estimating Vietnamese patients’ risk of falling into destitution

This paper represents the first research attempt to estimate the probabilities for Vietnamese patients to fall into destitution facing financial burdens occurring during their curative stay in hospital. The study models the risk against such factors as level of insurance coverage, location of patient, costliness of treatment, among others. The results show that very high probabilities of destitution, approximately 70%, apply to a large group of patients, who are nonresident, poor and ineligible for significant insurance coverage. There is also a probability of 58% that low-income patients who are seriously ill and face higher health care costs would quit their treatment. These facts will put Vietnamese government’s ambitious plan of increasing both universal coverage (UC) to 100% of expenditure and rate of UC beneficiaries to 100% at a serious test. The study also raises issues of asymmetric information and alternative financing options for the poor, who are most exposed to risk of destitution, following market-based health care reforms.

One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.