From respect for nature to agency as realisation in response to the ecological emergency

'The ecological emergency’ describes both our emergence into, and the way we relate within, a set of globally urgent circumstances, brought about through anthropogenic impact. I identify two phases to this emergency. Firstly, there is the anthropogenic impact itself, interpreted through various conceptual models. Secondly, however, is the increasingly entrenched commitment to divergent conceptual positions, that leads to a growing disparateness in attitudes, and a concurrent difficulty with finding any grounds for convergence in response. I begin by reviewing the environmental ethics literature in order to clarify which components of the implicit narratives and beliefs of different positions create the foundations for such disparateness of views. I identify the conceptual frameworks through which moral agency and human responsibility are viewed, and that justify an ethical response to the ecological emergency. In particular, I focus on Paul Taylor's thesis of 'respect for nature' as a framework for revising both the idea that we are ‘moral’ and the idea that we are ‘agents’ in this unique way, and I open to question the idea that any response to the ecological emergency need be couched in ethical terms. This revision leads me to formulate an alternative conceptual model that makes use of Timothy Morton’s idea of enmeshment. I propose that we dramatically revise our idea of moral agency using the idea of enmeshment as a starting point. I develop an alternative framework that locates our capacity for responsibility within our capacity for realisation, both in the sense of understanding, and of making real, sets of conditions within our enmeshment. I draw parallels between this idea of ‘realisation as agency’ and the work of Dōgen and other non-dualists. I then propose a revised understanding of ‘the good’ of systems from a biophysical perspective, and compare this with certain features of Asian traditions of thought. I consider the practical implications of these revisions, and I conclude that the act of paying close attention, or realising, contains our agency, as does the attitude, or manner, with which we focus. This gives us the basis for a convergent response to the ecological emergency: the way of our engagement that is the key to responding to the ecological emergency

Zazen, philosophy of mind, and the practicality of realising impermanence

This dissertation involves a general overview of the meditative practice of zazen and analytic philosophy of mind while suggesting a potential bridge between them in the form of an analysis of the practicality of realising impermanence. By the end of my argument I hope to have offered up some compelling evidence in favour of the idea that analytic philosophy would benefit greatly from adopting principles which are best learned and expressed through the practice of, and scholarship around, Zen Buddhism and in particular the treatment of the concept of impermanence. I demonstrate the Western philosophical tendency to make dichotomous assumptions about the nature of mind, even when explicitly denying a dualist framework. I do so by examining the historical and philosophical precedent for dualistic thinking in the work of figures such as Plato and Descartes. I expand on this idea by examining the psychology of categorisation - i.e. creating mental categories and boundaries - and demonstrating how such categorisations feeds back into behaviour in practical ways, both positive and negative. The Zen Buddhist principle of impermanence states that all phenomena are impermanent and therefore lack essential nature; this includes intellectual concepts such as the metaphysical framework of the analytic approach to mind. Impermanence is a principle which is realised through the embodied practice of zazen. By demonstrating its application to analytic philosophy of mind I show that zazen (and mindfulness practice in general) provides an ongoing opportunity for clearing up entrenched world views, metaphysical assumptions and dogmatic thinking. This in turn may promote a more holistic and ultimately more rewarding comprehension of the role of first-person experience in understanding the world. My argument is not limited to analytic philosophy of mind but reflects broad aspects of thinking in general, and I explain its application to issues of social importance, in particular education systems.

Nihilism and emptiness: Nishitani's encounter with Nietzsche

In this thesis, I examine the relationship between the Kyoto School philosopher, Nishitani Keiji, and the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, focusing on the two thinkers’ respective approaches to the problem of nihilism. The work begins by positioning Nishitani’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s account of nihilism with reference to diverse readings of Nietzsche in Western scholarship. I then consider the development of Nishitani’s reading of Nietzsche from his lecture series on nihilism, The Self- Overcoming of Nihilism, through to his magnum opus, Religion and Nothingness. I make two key contributions to recent scholarly debate on Nishitani’s relationship to Nietzsche. The first is to emphasise the importance of Nishitani’s response to the idea of eternal recurrence for understanding his critical approach to Nietzsche’s thinking. I argue against the view, offered by Bret Davis, that Nishitani’s criticisms of Nietzsche are primarily based on the former’s negative assessment of the idea of will to power. The second contribution is to situate Nishitani’s critical approach to eternal recurrence within his broader attempt to formulate a Zen-influenced conception of temporality and historicity. I then argue for the necessity of this conceptual background for coming to grips with his conception of the ‘transhistorical’ grounds of historicity in emptiness (śūnyatā), as outlined in the later chapters of Religion and Nothingness.