Justifying jihad: US politics, propaganda and the Afghan mujahedeen

Hard-line anti-communists in the United States recognised the potential for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to embroil their super-power rival in a ‘Vietnam-like quagmire.’ Their covert operation to arm the mujahedeen is well documented. This dissertation argues that propaganda and public diplomacy were powerful and essential instruments of this campaign. It examines the protagonists of this strategy, their policies, initiatives and programmes offering a comprehensive analysis heretofore absent. It stretches from the dying days of the Carter administration when Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the ‘opportunity’ presented by the invasion to the Soviet’s withdrawal in 1989. The aim of these information strategies was to damage Soviet credibility and enhance that of the US, considered under threat from growing ‘moral equivalence’ amongst international publics. The conflict could help the US regain strategic advantage in South Asia undermined by the ‘loss’ of Iran. The Reagan administration used it to justify the projection of US military might that it believed was eviscerated under Carter and emasculated by the lingering legacy of Vietnam. The research engages with source material from the Reagan Presidential Library, the United States Information Agency archives and the Library of Congress as well as a number of online archives. The material is multi-archival and multi-media including documentaries, booklets, press conferences, summit programmes and news-clips as well as national security policy documents and contemporaneous media commentary. It concludes that propaganda and public diplomacy were integral to the Reagan administration and other mujahedeen supporters’ determination to challenge the USSR. It finds that the conflict was used to justify military rearmament, further strategic aims and reassert US power. These Cold War machinations had a considerable impact on the course of the conflict and undermined efforts at resolution and reconciliation with profound implications for the future stability of Afghanistan and the world.

Canon Ulick Bourke: cultural nationalism, popular politics and the Knock apparition

Accounts of the Knock Apparition, academic and devotional, always start by relating that the Virgin Mary, St Joseph, and St John the Evangelist appeared to fifteen people on a rainy Thursday evening at the south gable of Knock chapel, Co. Mayo, on 21 August 1879. They usually mention that the Land War was in progress. Despite the fact Knock supposedly receives one and a half million visitors a year, until three decades ago no scholar had examined accounts of the apparition. Recent work has sought to define the Knock Apparition in light of the Land War, the ‘devotional revolution’, which took place in Irish Catholicism in the quarter century prior to the apparition, and the influence of the parish priest, Archdeacon Bartholomew Cavanagh. This thesis acknowledges these factors, but contends that the single greatest force in shaping accounts of the apparition was Canon Ulick Joseph Bourke, one of the three priests on the commission of investigation into Knock. Furthermore, this thesis proves that Bourke’s role as a central figure in influencing the later Gaelic revival has been overlooked by scholars of cultural nationalism. By examining Bourke’s cultural nationalism and views on antiquity and language, as well as his politics and reaction to the Land War, this thesis argues that Bourke sought to create an orthodox version of the apparition which could be reconciled to his views on Irish Catholic identity, while serving as a bulwark against threats to the temporal power of the clergy. In addition to influencing accounts of the apparition through his role in interviewing the witnesses and recording their testimony, Bourke further shaped the narrative of the apparition by controlling its dissemination, to the extent that all accounts of Knock are based on a text largely created by him.