"Farò quel che me piacerà": Fictional women in villotta voice resistance

Published Version

Spinoza on method and freedom

The thesis as a whole argues that Spinoza’s Ethics in both method and content is aimed at the normal, partly rational person. Chapter 1 is on Spinoza’s writing style, finding that rather than being arid and technical, it aims to convince the reader by means of various rhetorical techniques, so does not assume an already rational reader. The following chapters of Part 1 examine whether the Ethics’ use of the synthetic geometric method exposes it to Descartes’ critique of that method in the “Second Replies” to his Meditations, that it is not suitable for pedagogy. This involves a consideration of the role of the TIE, finding in that early text not the analytic wing of a two-part analytic-synthetic method, but rather a defence and necessitation of a stand-alone synthetic method. Part 2 of the thesis develops this study of Spinoza’s writing for the common man to consider whether he is writing about the common man. This is done by examining one of the seemingly most abstract propositions in the Ethics, 4P72, which claims that a free man will not deceive even to save his own life. The study examines who exactly is this “free man” and what is his role in the Ethics. The study looks at the examples of free men in the TTP and at the concept of the model in the Ethics, and finds that rather than the free man being an impossible ideal which we can aim at but never achieve, everyone is free to some extent, and that even normal people are at times “the free man”.

Zazen, philosophy of mind, and the practicality of realising impermanence

This dissertation involves a general overview of the meditative practice of zazen and analytic philosophy of mind while suggesting a potential bridge between them in the form of an analysis of the practicality of realising impermanence. By the end of my argument I hope to have offered up some compelling evidence in favour of the idea that analytic philosophy would benefit greatly from adopting principles which are best learned and expressed through the practice of, and scholarship around, Zen Buddhism and in particular the treatment of the concept of impermanence. I demonstrate the Western philosophical tendency to make dichotomous assumptions about the nature of mind, even when explicitly denying a dualist framework. I do so by examining the historical and philosophical precedent for dualistic thinking in the work of figures such as Plato and Descartes. I expand on this idea by examining the psychology of categorisation - i.e. creating mental categories and boundaries - and demonstrating how such categorisations feeds back into behaviour in practical ways, both positive and negative. The Zen Buddhist principle of impermanence states that all phenomena are impermanent and therefore lack essential nature; this includes intellectual concepts such as the metaphysical framework of the analytic approach to mind. Impermanence is a principle which is realised through the embodied practice of zazen. By demonstrating its application to analytic philosophy of mind I show that zazen (and mindfulness practice in general) provides an ongoing opportunity for clearing up entrenched world views, metaphysical assumptions and dogmatic thinking. This in turn may promote a more holistic and ultimately more rewarding comprehension of the role of first-person experience in understanding the world. My argument is not limited to analytic philosophy of mind but reflects broad aspects of thinking in general, and I explain its application to issues of social importance, in particular education systems.