Transhuman education: Sloterdijk's reading of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism

Peter Sloterdijk presented a reading of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism at a conference held at Elmau in 1999. Reinterpreting the meaning of humanism in the light of Heidegger's Letter, Sloterdijk focused his presentation on the need to redefine education as a form of genetic ‘taming’ and proposed what seemed to be support for positive eugenics. Although Sloterdijk claimed that he only wanted to open a debate on the issue, he could not have been surprised at the level of opposition this suggestion aroused. In the weeks following, he blamed Habermas for raising this opposition and for refusing to engage with him openly. Although Luis Arenas has chronicled the aftermath of Sloterdijk's paper, it may be of interest to educators to examine how Heidegger's text is presented. What is this new humanism? If Heidegger's new humanism was based on a mystical attitude towards Being, so Sloterdijk's new humanism was to be based on the materialist principles of a biotechnological age. Unlike Heidegger who rejected technology as yet one further example of the forgetfulness of Being, Sloterdijk seems to embrace technology and the enhancement of the human body and mind as the next great step forward in educational theory. Could he possibly be right? Is education in these times a partner or an opponent of the technological enhancement of the human being? This article tries to identify Sloterdijk's disagreements with Heidegger on the question of the human.

Claude McKay and the transnational novel

This thesis considers the three works of fiction of the Jamaican author Claude McKay (1889-1948) as a coherent transnational trilogy which dramatises the semi-autobiographical complexities of diasporic exile and return in the period of the 1920s and 1930s. Chapter One explores McKay’s urban North American novel, Home to Harlem (1928). I suggest that we need to ‘reworld’ conceptions of McKay’s writing in order to release him from his canonical confinement in the Harlem Renaissance. Querying the problematics of the city space, of sexuality and of race as they emerge in the novel, this chapter considers McKay’s percipient understanding of the need to reconfigure diasporic identity beyond the limits set by American nationalism. Chapter Two engages with McKay’s novel of portside Marseilles, Banjo (1929), and considers the homosocial interactions of the vagabond collective. A comparison of North America and France as supposed exemplars of individual liberty highlights the unsuitability of nationalistic prerogatives to an internally diverse black diaspora. Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic construct provides a suggestive space in which to re-imagine the possibilities of affiliation in the port. The latter section of the chapter examines McKay’s particular influence on, and relationship, to the Négritude movement and Pan-African philosophies. Chapter Three focuses on McKay’s third novel, Banana Bottom (1933). I suggest here that the three novels comprise a coherent New World Trilogy comparable to Edward (Kamau) Brathwaite’s trilogy, The Arrivants. This chapter considers both the Caribbean and the transnational dimensions to McKay’s work.

Milton and romance: vernacular romance and chivalric traditions in Paradise Lost

The thesis examines Milton's strategic use of romance in Paradise Lost, arguing that such a handling of romance is a provocative realignment of its values according to the poet’s Christian focus. The thesis argues that Milton's use of romance is not simply the importation of a tradition into the poem; it entails a backward judgement on that tradition, defining its idealising tendencies as fundamentally misplaced. The thesis also examines the Caroline uses of romance and chivalry in the 1630s to provide a vision of British unification, and Milton's reaction to this political agenda.

Max Stirner's relevance to contemporary philosophy: a critical analysis

The aim of this dissertation is to revive the 19th-century thinker Max Stirner’s thought through a critical reexamination of his mistaken legacy as a ‘political’ thinker. The reading of Stirner that I present is one of an ontological thinker, spurred on as much—if not more—by the contents of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as it is the radical roots that Hegel unintentionally planted. In the first chapter, the role of language in Stirner’s thought is examined, and the problems to which his conception of language seem to give rise are addressed. The second chapter looks at Stirner’s purportedly ‘anarchistic’ politics and finds the ‘anarchist’ reading of Stirner misguided. Rather than being a ‘political’ anarchist, it is argued that we ought to understand Stirner as advocating a sort of ‘ontological’ anarchism in which the very existence of authority is questioned. In the third chapter, I look at the political ramifications of Stirner’s ontology as well as the critique of liberalism contained within it, and argue that the politics implicit in his philosophy shares more in common with the tradition of political realism than it does anarchism. The fourth chapter is dedicated to an examination of Stirner’s anti-humanism, which is concluded to be much different than the ‘anti-humanisms’ associated with other, more famous thinkers, such as Foucault and Heidegger. In the fifth and final chapter, I provide an answer to the question(s) of how, if, and to what extent Friedrich Nietzsche was influenced by Stirner. It is concluded that the complete lack of evidence that Nietzsche ever read Stirner is proof enough to dismiss accusations of plagiarism on Nietzsche’s part, thus emphasizing the originality and singularity of both thinkers.

"Farò quel che me piacerà": Fictional women in villotta voice resistance

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