The Ford administration, Angola and the perception of Post-Vietnam US credibility, 1974-1976

This thesis is a study of how the Gerald Ford administration struggled to address a perceived loss of US credibility after the collapse of Vietnam, with a focus on the role of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the formulation, implementation and subsequent defence of US Angolan policy. By examining the immediate post-Vietnam period, this thesis shows that Vietnam had a significant impact on Kissinger’s actions on Angola, which resulted in an ill conceived covert operation in another third world conflict. In 1974, Africa was a neglected region in Cold War US foreign policy, yet the effects of the Portuguese revolution led to a rapid decolonization of its African territories, of which Angola was to become the focus of superpower competition. After South Vietnam collapsed in April 1975, Kissinger became fixated on restoring the perceived loss of US prestige, Angola provided the first opportunity to address this. Despite objections from his advisors, Kissinger methodically engineered a covert program to assist two anti-Marxist guerrilla groups in Angola. As the crisis escalated, the media discovered the operation and the Congress decided to cease all funding. A period of heated tensions ensued, resulting in Kissinger creating a new African policy to outmanoeuvre his critics publicly, while privately castigating them to foreign leaders. This thesis argues that Kissinger’s dismissal of internal dissent and opposition from the Congress was influenced by what he perceived as bureaucrats being affected by the Vietnam syndrome, and his obsession with restoring US credibility. By looking at the private and public records – as expressed in government meetings and official reports, US newspaper and television coverage and diplomatic cables – this thesis addresses the question of how the lessons of Vietnam failed to influence Kissinger’s actions in Angola, but the lessons of Angola were heavily influential in the construction of a new US-African policy.

Challengers to provisional republicanism: the official republican movement, people’s democracy and the Irish republican socialist party, 1968–98

The Provisional IRA and its political wing Sinn Féin have attracted by far the greatest scholarly interest of all the players in the Northern Irish conflict. This emphasis is perfectly legitimate, given the centrality of the Provos to so many turning-points in the conflict, from the collapse of Stormont in the early 1970s to the hunger strikes of the following decade and the ceasefires which were followed by the Belfast Agreement. My project, however, looks at political groups that at one time or another challenged the Provos for leadership of the militant, anti-state constituency in Northern Ireland (chiefly based in the Catholic working class). Although never as large or influential as the Provisional republicans, groups such as the Official IRA and the Irish Republican Socialist Party sometimes had a discernible impact on the course of events which is overlooked by most studies, and often pioneered ideas and tactics that were later adopted by the Provos themselves. The idea that republicans should embrace political action and work in broad campaigning alliances was promoted by the IRSP and socialist groups such as People’s Democracy before it was taken up by Gerry Adams and his allies, while the Official IRA supported the principle of a settlement based on democratization of the Northern Irish state, which was later accepted by Sinn Féin in the form of the Belfast Agreement. The goal of my research is to provide a novel perspective on the conflict in Northern Ireland, while engaging with theoretical debates about its character.