Analysing energy detector diversity receivers for spectrum sensing

The analysis of energy detector systems is a well studied topic in the literature: numerous models have been derived describing the behaviour of single and multiple antenna architectures operating in a variety of radio environments. However, in many cases of interest, these models are not in a closed form and so their evaluation requires the use of numerical methods. In general, these are computationally expensive, which can cause difficulties in certain scenarios, such as in the optimisation of device parameters on low cost hardware. The problem becomes acute in situations where the signal to noise ratio is small and reliable detection is to be ensured or where the number of samples of the received signal is large. Furthermore, due to the analytic complexity of the models, further insight into the behaviour of various system parameters of interest is not readily apparent. In this thesis, an approximation based approach is taken towards the analysis of such systems. By focusing on the situations where exact analyses become complicated, and making a small number of astute simplifications to the underlying mathematical models, it is possible to derive novel, accurate and compact descriptions of system behaviour. Approximations are derived for the analysis of energy detectors with single and multiple antennae operating on additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and independent and identically distributed Rayleigh, Nakagami-m and Rice channels; in the multiple antenna case, approximations are derived for systems with maximal ratio combiner (MRC), equal gain combiner (EGC) and square law combiner (SLC) diversity. In each case, error bounds are derived describing the maximum error resulting from the use of the approximations. In addition, it is demonstrated that the derived approximations require fewer computations of simple functions than any of the exact models available in the literature. Consequently, the regions of applicability of the approximations directly complement the regions of applicability of the available exact models. Further novel approximations for other system parameters of interest, such as sample complexity, minimum detectable signal to noise ratio and diversity gain, are also derived. In the course of the analysis, a novel theorem describing the convergence of the chi square, noncentral chi square and gamma distributions towards the normal distribution is derived. The theorem describes a tight upper bound on the error resulting from the application of the central limit theorem to random variables of the aforementioned distributions and gives a much better description of the resulting error than existing Berry-Esseen type bounds. A second novel theorem, providing an upper bound on the maximum error resulting from the use of the central limit theorem to approximate the noncentral chi square distribution where the noncentrality parameter is a multiple of the number of degrees of freedom, is also derived.

Profiling side-channel attacks on cryptographic algorithms

Traditionally, attacks on cryptographic algorithms looked for mathematical weaknesses in the underlying structure of a cipher. Side-channel attacks, however, look to extract secret key information based on the leakage from the device on which the cipher is implemented, be it smart-card, microprocessor, dedicated hardware or personal computer. Attacks based on the power consumption, electromagnetic emanations and execution time have all been practically demonstrated on a range of devices to reveal partial secret-key information from which the full key can be reconstructed. The focus of this thesis is power analysis, more specifically a class of attacks known as profiling attacks. These attacks assume a potential attacker has access to, or can control, an identical device to that which is under attack, which allows him to profile the power consumption of operations or data flow during encryption. This assumes a stronger adversary than traditional non-profiling attacks such as differential or correlation power analysis, however the ability to model a device allows templates to be used post-profiling to extract key information from many different target devices using the power consumption of very few encryptions. This allows an adversary to overcome protocols intended to prevent secret key recovery by restricting the number of available traces. In this thesis a detailed investigation of template attacks is conducted, along with how the selection of various attack parameters practically affect the efficiency of the secret key recovery, as well as examining the underlying assumption of profiling attacks in that the power consumption of one device can be used to extract secret keys from another. Trace only attacks, where the corresponding plaintext or ciphertext data is unavailable, are then investigated against both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms with the goal of key recovery from a single trace. This allows an adversary to bypass many of the currently proposed countermeasures, particularly in the asymmetric domain. An investigation into machine-learning methods for side-channel analysis as an alternative to template or stochastic methods is also conducted, with support vector machines, logistic regression and neural networks investigated from a side-channel viewpoint. Both binary and multi-class classification attack scenarios are examined in order to explore the relative strengths of each algorithm. Finally these machine-learning based alternatives are empirically compared with template attacks, with their respective merits examined with regards to attack efficiency.