The corporate social responsibility movement and law's empire: Is there a conflict?

At the heart of corporate governance and social responsibility discourse is recognition of the fact that the modern corporation is primarily governed by the profit maximisation imperative coupled with moral and ethical concerns that such a limited imperative drives the actions of large and wealthy corporations which have the ability to act in influential and significant ways, shaping how our social world is experienced. The actions of the corporation and its management will have a wide sphere of impact over all of its stakeholders whether these are employees, shareholders, consumers or the community in which the corporation is located. As globalisation has become central to the way we think it is also clear that ‘community’ has an ever expanding meaning which may include workers and communities living very far away from Corporate HQ. In recent years academic commentators have become increasingly concerned about the emphasis on what can be called short-term profit maximisation and the perception that this extremist interpretation of the profit imperative results in morally and ethically unacceptable outcomes.1 Hence demands for more corporate social responsibility. Following Cadbury’s2 classification of corporate social responsibility into three distinct areas, this paper will argue that once the legally regulated tier is left aside corporate responsibility can become so nebulous as to be relatively meaningless. The argument is not that corporations should not be required to act in socially responsible ways but that unless supported by regulation, which either demands high standards, or at the very least incentivises the attainment of such standards such initiatives are doomed to failure. The paper will illustrate by reference to various chosen cases that law’s discourse has already signposted ways to consider and resolve corporate governance problems in the broader social responsibility context.3 It will also illustrate how corporate responsibility can and must be supported by legal measures. Secondly, this paper will consider the potential conflict between an emphasis on corporate social responsibility and the regulatory approach.4 Finally, this paper will place the current interest in corporate social responsibility within the broader debate on the relationship between law and non-legally enforceable norms and will present some reflections on the norm debate arising from this consideration of the CSR movement.

Moral shielding: A grounded theory of integrity maintenance in multidisciplinary teams

Using a classic grounded theory methodology (CGT), this study explores the phenomenon of moral shielding within mental health multidisciplinary teams (MDTS). The study was located within three catchment areas engaged in acute mental health service practice. The main concern identified was the maintenance of a sense of personal integrity during situational binds. Through theoretical sampling thirty two practitioners, including; doctors, nurses, social workers, occupational therapists, counsellors and psychologists, where interviewed face to face. In addition, emergent concepts were identified through observation of MDTs in clinical and research practice. Following a classic grounded theory methodology, data collection and analysis occurred simultaneously. A constant comparative approach was adopted and resulted in the immergence of three sub- core categories; moral abdication, moral hinting and pseudo-compliance. Moral abdication seeks to re-position within an event in order to avoid or deflect the initial obligation to act, it is a strategy used to remove or reduce moral ownership. Moral gauging represents the monitoring of an event with the goal of judging the congruence of personal principles and commitments with that of other practitioners. This strategy is enacted in a bid to seek allies for the support of a given moral position. Pseudo-compliance represents behaviour that hides desired principles and commitments in order to shield them from challenge. This strategy portrays agreement with the dominant position within the MDT, whilst holding a contrary position. It seeks to preserve a reservoir of emotional energy required to maintain a sense of personal integrity. Practitioners who were successful in enacting moral shielding were found to not experience significant emotional distress associated with the phenomenon of moral distress; suggesting that these practitioners had found mechanisms to manage situational binds that threatened their sense of personal integrity.

From respect for nature to agency as realisation in response to the ecological emergency

'The ecological emergency’ describes both our emergence into, and the way we relate within, a set of globally urgent circumstances, brought about through anthropogenic impact. I identify two phases to this emergency. Firstly, there is the anthropogenic impact itself, interpreted through various conceptual models. Secondly, however, is the increasingly entrenched commitment to divergent conceptual positions, that leads to a growing disparateness in attitudes, and a concurrent difficulty with finding any grounds for convergence in response. I begin by reviewing the environmental ethics literature in order to clarify which components of the implicit narratives and beliefs of different positions create the foundations for such disparateness of views. I identify the conceptual frameworks through which moral agency and human responsibility are viewed, and that justify an ethical response to the ecological emergency. In particular, I focus on Paul Taylor's thesis of 'respect for nature' as a framework for revising both the idea that we are ‘moral’ and the idea that we are ‘agents’ in this unique way, and I open to question the idea that any response to the ecological emergency need be couched in ethical terms. This revision leads me to formulate an alternative conceptual model that makes use of Timothy Morton’s idea of enmeshment. I propose that we dramatically revise our idea of moral agency using the idea of enmeshment as a starting point. I develop an alternative framework that locates our capacity for responsibility within our capacity for realisation, both in the sense of understanding, and of making real, sets of conditions within our enmeshment. I draw parallels between this idea of ‘realisation as agency’ and the work of Dōgen and other non-dualists. I then propose a revised understanding of ‘the good’ of systems from a biophysical perspective, and compare this with certain features of Asian traditions of thought. I consider the practical implications of these revisions, and I conclude that the act of paying close attention, or realising, contains our agency, as does the attitude, or manner, with which we focus. This gives us the basis for a convergent response to the ecological emergency: the way of our engagement that is the key to responding to the ecological emergency