Secure architectures for pairing based public key cryptography

Along with the growing demand for cryptosystems in systems ranging from large servers to mobile devices, suitable cryptogrophic protocols for use under certain constraints are becoming more and more important. Constraints such as calculation time, area, efficiency and security, must be considered by the designer. Elliptic curves, since their introduction to public key cryptography in 1985 have challenged established public key and signature generation schemes such as RSA, offering more security per bit. Amongst Elliptic curve based systems, pairing based cryptographies are thoroughly researched and can be used in many public key protocols such as identity based schemes. For hardware implementions of pairing based protocols, all components which calculate operations over Elliptic curves can be considered. Designers of the pairing algorithms must choose calculation blocks and arrange the basic operations carefully so that the implementation can meet the constraints of time and hardware resource area. This thesis deals with different hardware architectures to accelerate the pairing based cryptosystems in the field of characteristic two. Using different top-level architectures the hardware efficiency of operations that run at different times is first considered in this thesis. Security is another important aspect of pairing based cryptography to be considered in practically Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. The naively implemented hardware accelerators for pairing based cryptographies can be vulnerable when taking the physical analysis attacks into consideration. This thesis considered the weaknesses in pairing based public key cryptography and addresses the particular calculations in the systems that are insecure. In this case, countermeasures should be applied to protect the weak link of the implementation to improve and perfect the pairing based algorithms. Some important rules that the designers must obey to improve the security of the cryptosystems are proposed. According to these rules, three countermeasures that protect the pairing based cryptosystems against SCA attacks are applied. The implementations of the countermeasures are presented and their performances are investigated.

Charge compensation and Ce3+ formation in trivalent doping of the CeO2(110) surface: The key role of dopant ionic radius

In this paper, we use density functional theory corrected for on-site Coulomb interactions (DFT + U) and hybrid DFT (HSE06 functional) to study the defects formed when the ceria (110) surface is doped with a series of trivalent dopants, namely, Al3+, Sc3+, Y3+, and In 3+. Using the hybrid DFT HSE06 exchange-correlation functional as a benchmark, we show that doping the (110) surface with a single trivalent ion leads to formation of a localized MCe / + O O • (M = the 3+ dopant), O- hole state, confirming the description found with DFT + U. We use DFT + U to investigate the energetics of dopant compensation through formation of the 2MCe ′ +VO ̈ defect, that is, compensation of two dopants with an oxygen vacancy. In conjunction with earlier work on La-doped CeO2, we find that the stability of the compensating anion vacancy depends on the dopant ionic radius. For Al3+, which has the smallest ionic radius, and Sc3+ and In3+, with intermediate ionic radii, formation of a compensating oxygen vacancy is stable. On the other hand, the Y3+ dopant, with an ionic radius close to that of Ce4+, shows a positive anion vacancy formation energy, as does La3+, which is larger than Ce4+ (J. Phys.: Condens. Matter 2010, 20, 135004). When considering the resulting electronic structure, in Al3+ doping, oxygen hole compensation is found. However, Sc 3+, In3+, and Y3+ show the formation of a reduced Ce3+ cation and an uncompensated oxygen hole, similar to La3+. These results suggest that the ionic radius of trivalent dopants strongly influences the final defect formed when doping ceria with 3+ cations. In light of these findings, experimental investigations of these systems will be welcome.