Valveless membrane pump for transdermal injection and aspiration

Science Foundation Ireland (CSET - Centre for Science, Engineering and Technology, Grant No. 07/CE/11147)

Properties and applications of injection locking in 1.55 μm quantum-dash mode-locked semiconductor lasers

Mode-locked semiconductor lasers are compact pulsed sources with ultra-narrow pulse widths and high repetition-rates. In order to use these sources in real applications, their performance needs to be optimised in several aspects, usually by external control. We experimentally investigate the behaviour of recently-developed quantum-dash mode-locked lasers (QDMLLs) emitting at 1.55 μm under external optical injection. Single-section and two-section lasers with different repetition frequencies and active-region structures are studied. Particularly, we are interested in a regime which the laser remains mode-locked and the individual modes are simultaneously phase-locked to the external laser. Injection-locked self-mode-locked lasers demonstrate tunable microwave generation at first or second harmonic of the free-running repetition frequency with sub-MHz RF linewidth. For two-section mode-locked lasers, using dual-mode optical injection (injection of two coherent CW lines), narrowing the RF linewidth close to that of the electrical source, narrowing the optical linewidths and reduction in the time-bandwidth product is achieved. Under optimised bias conditions of the slave laser, a repetition frequency tuning ratio >2% is achieved, a record for a monolithic semiconductor mode-locked laser. In addition, we demonstrate a novel all-optical stabilisation technique for mode-locked semiconductor lasers by combination of CW optical injection and optical feedback to simultaneously improve the time-bandwidth product and timing-jitter of the laser. This scheme does not need an RF source and no optical to electrical conversion is required and thus is ideal for photonic integration. Finally, an application of injection-locked mode-locked lasers is introduced in a multichannel phase-sensitive amplifier (PSA). We show that with dual-mode injection-locking, simultaneous phase-synchronisation of two channels to local pump sources is realised through one injection-locking stage. An experimental proof of concept is demonstrated for two 10 Gbps phase-encoded (DPSK) channels showing more than 7 dB phase-sensitive gain and less than 1 dB penalty of the receiver sensitivity.

Profiling side-channel attacks on cryptographic algorithms

Traditionally, attacks on cryptographic algorithms looked for mathematical weaknesses in the underlying structure of a cipher. Side-channel attacks, however, look to extract secret key information based on the leakage from the device on which the cipher is implemented, be it smart-card, microprocessor, dedicated hardware or personal computer. Attacks based on the power consumption, electromagnetic emanations and execution time have all been practically demonstrated on a range of devices to reveal partial secret-key information from which the full key can be reconstructed. The focus of this thesis is power analysis, more specifically a class of attacks known as profiling attacks. These attacks assume a potential attacker has access to, or can control, an identical device to that which is under attack, which allows him to profile the power consumption of operations or data flow during encryption. This assumes a stronger adversary than traditional non-profiling attacks such as differential or correlation power analysis, however the ability to model a device allows templates to be used post-profiling to extract key information from many different target devices using the power consumption of very few encryptions. This allows an adversary to overcome protocols intended to prevent secret key recovery by restricting the number of available traces. In this thesis a detailed investigation of template attacks is conducted, along with how the selection of various attack parameters practically affect the efficiency of the secret key recovery, as well as examining the underlying assumption of profiling attacks in that the power consumption of one device can be used to extract secret keys from another. Trace only attacks, where the corresponding plaintext or ciphertext data is unavailable, are then investigated against both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms with the goal of key recovery from a single trace. This allows an adversary to bypass many of the currently proposed countermeasures, particularly in the asymmetric domain. An investigation into machine-learning methods for side-channel analysis as an alternative to template or stochastic methods is also conducted, with support vector machines, logistic regression and neural networks investigated from a side-channel viewpoint. Both binary and multi-class classification attack scenarios are examined in order to explore the relative strengths of each algorithm. Finally these machine-learning based alternatives are empirically compared with template attacks, with their respective merits examined with regards to attack efficiency.