Aesthetic campaigns and counter-campaigns. Jorge Luis Borges and a century of the Argentine detective story (1877-1977)

This cultural history of Argentine crime fiction involves a comprehensive analysis of the literary and critical traditions within the genre, paying particular attention to the series of ‘aesthetic campaigns’ waged by Jorge Luis Borges and others during the period between 1933 and 1977. The methodological approach described in the introductory chapter builds upon the critical insight that in Argentina, generic discourse has consistently been the domain, not only of literary critics in the traditional mould, but also of prominent writers of fiction and specialists from other disciplines, effectively transcending the traditional tripartite ‘division of labour’ between writers, critics and readers. Chapter One charts the early development of crime fiction, and contextualises the evolution of the classical and hardboiled variants that were to provide a durable conceptual framework for discourse in the Argentine context. Chapter Two examines a number of pioneering early works by Argentine authors, before analysing Borges’ multi-faceted aesthetic campaign on behalf of the ‘classical’ detective story. Chapter Three examines a transitional period for the Argentine crime genre, book-ended by the three Vea y Lea magazine-sponsored detective story competitions that acted as a vital stimulus to innovation among Argentine writers. It includes a substantial treatment of the work of Rodolfo Walsh, documenting his transition from crime writer and anthologist to pioneer of the non-fiction novel and investigative journalism traditions. Chapter Four examines the period in which the novela negra came to achieve dominance in Argentina, in particular the aesthetic counter-campaigns conducted by Ricardo Piglia and others on behalf of the hard-boiled variant. The study concludes with a detailed analysis of Pablo Leonardo’s La mala guita (1976), which is considered as a paradigmatic example of crime fiction in Argentina in this period. The final chapter presents conclusions and a summary of the dissertation, and recommendations for further research.

The Ford administration, Angola and the perception of Post-Vietnam US credibility, 1974-1976

This thesis is a study of how the Gerald Ford administration struggled to address a perceived loss of US credibility after the collapse of Vietnam, with a focus on the role of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the formulation, implementation and subsequent defence of US Angolan policy. By examining the immediate post-Vietnam period, this thesis shows that Vietnam had a significant impact on Kissinger’s actions on Angola, which resulted in an ill conceived covert operation in another third world conflict. In 1974, Africa was a neglected region in Cold War US foreign policy, yet the effects of the Portuguese revolution led to a rapid decolonization of its African territories, of which Angola was to become the focus of superpower competition. After South Vietnam collapsed in April 1975, Kissinger became fixated on restoring the perceived loss of US prestige, Angola provided the first opportunity to address this. Despite objections from his advisors, Kissinger methodically engineered a covert program to assist two anti-Marxist guerrilla groups in Angola. As the crisis escalated, the media discovered the operation and the Congress decided to cease all funding. A period of heated tensions ensued, resulting in Kissinger creating a new African policy to outmanoeuvre his critics publicly, while privately castigating them to foreign leaders. This thesis argues that Kissinger’s dismissal of internal dissent and opposition from the Congress was influenced by what he perceived as bureaucrats being affected by the Vietnam syndrome, and his obsession with restoring US credibility. By looking at the private and public records – as expressed in government meetings and official reports, US newspaper and television coverage and diplomatic cables – this thesis addresses the question of how the lessons of Vietnam failed to influence Kissinger’s actions in Angola, but the lessons of Angola were heavily influential in the construction of a new US-African policy.