State building as strategy: An interrogation of NATO's comprehensive approach in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011

The core of this thesis is the study of NATO’s Comprehensive Approach strategy to state building in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011. It argues that this strategy sustained operational and tactical practices which were ineffective in responding to the evolved nature of the security problem. The thesis interrogates the Comprehensive Approach along ontological, empirical and epistemological lines and concludes that the failure of the Comprehensive Approach in the specific Afghan case is, in fact, indicative of underlying theoretical and pragmatic flaws which, therefore, generalize the dilemma. The research is pragmatic in nature, employing mixed methods (quantitative and qualitative) concurrently. Qualitative methods include research into primary and secondary literature sources supplemented with the author’s personal experiences in Afghanistan in 2008 and various NATO HQ and Canadian settings. Quantitative research includes an empirical case study focussing on NATO’s Afghan experience and its attempt at state building between 2006 and 2011. This study incorporates a historical review of NATO’s evolutionary involvement in Afghanistan incorporating the subject timeframe; offers an analysis of human development and governance related data mapped to expected outcomes of the Afghan National Development Strategy and NATO’s comprehensive campaign design; and interrogates the Comprehensive Approach strategy by means of an analysis of conceptual, institutional and capability gaps in the context of an integrated investigational framework. The results of the case study leads to an investigation of a series of research questions related to the potential impact of the failure of the Comprehensive Approach for NATO in Afghanistan and the limits of state building as a means of attaining security for the Alliance.

Redefining military memorials and commemoration and how they have changed since the 19th century with a focus on Anglo-American practice

This thesis is a study of military memorials and commemoration with a focus on Anglo-American practice. The main question is: How has history defined military memorials and commemoration and how have they changed since the 19th century. In an effort to resolve this, the work examines both historic and contemporary forms of memorials and commemoration and establishes that remembrance in sites of collective memory has been influenced by politics, conflicts and religion. Much has been written since the Great War about remembrance and memorialization; however, there is no common lexicon throughout the literature. In order to better explain and understand this complex subject, the work includes an up-to-date literature review and for the first time, terminologies are properly explained and defined. Particular attention is placed on recognizing important military legacies, being familiar with spiritual influences and identifying classic and new signs of remembrance. The thesis contends that commemoration is composed of three key principles – recognition, respect and reflection – that are intractably linked to the fabric of memorials. It also argues that it is time for the study of memorials to come of age and proposes Memorialogy as an interdisciplinary field of study of memorials and associated commemorative practices. Moreover, a more modern, adaptive, General Classification System is presented as a means of identifying and re-defining memorials according to certain groups, types and forms. Lastly, this thesis examines how peacekeeping and peace support operations are being memorialized and how the American tragic events of 11 September 2001 and the war in Afghanistan have forever changed the nature of memorials and commemoration within Canada and elsewhere. This work goes beyond what has been studied and written about over the last century and provides a deeper level of analysis and a fresh approach to understanding the field of Memorialogy.

Justifying jihad: US politics, propaganda and the Afghan mujahedeen

Hard-line anti-communists in the United States recognised the potential for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to embroil their super-power rival in a ‘Vietnam-like quagmire.’ Their covert operation to arm the mujahedeen is well documented. This dissertation argues that propaganda and public diplomacy were powerful and essential instruments of this campaign. It examines the protagonists of this strategy, their policies, initiatives and programmes offering a comprehensive analysis heretofore absent. It stretches from the dying days of the Carter administration when Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the ‘opportunity’ presented by the invasion to the Soviet’s withdrawal in 1989. The aim of these information strategies was to damage Soviet credibility and enhance that of the US, considered under threat from growing ‘moral equivalence’ amongst international publics. The conflict could help the US regain strategic advantage in South Asia undermined by the ‘loss’ of Iran. The Reagan administration used it to justify the projection of US military might that it believed was eviscerated under Carter and emasculated by the lingering legacy of Vietnam. The research engages with source material from the Reagan Presidential Library, the United States Information Agency archives and the Library of Congress as well as a number of online archives. The material is multi-archival and multi-media including documentaries, booklets, press conferences, summit programmes and news-clips as well as national security policy documents and contemporaneous media commentary. It concludes that propaganda and public diplomacy were integral to the Reagan administration and other mujahedeen supporters’ determination to challenge the USSR. It finds that the conflict was used to justify military rearmament, further strategic aims and reassert US power. These Cold War machinations had a considerable impact on the course of the conflict and undermined efforts at resolution and reconciliation with profound implications for the future stability of Afghanistan and the world.