The Retail Market for Bednets in Kenya: How Well Is It Working?

Background Achieving the goals set by Roll Back Malaria and the Government of Kenya for use of insecticide treated bednets (ITNs) will require that the private retail market for nets and insecticide treatments grow substantially. This paper applies some basic concepts of market structure and pricing to a set of recently-collected retail price data from Kenya in order to answer the question, “How well are Kenyan retail markets for ITNs working?” Methods Data on the availability and prices of ITNs at a wide range of retail outlets throughout Kenya were collected in January 2002, and vendors and manufacturers were interviewed regarding market structure. Findings Untreated nets are manufactured in Kenya by a number of companies and are widely available in large and medium-sized towns. Availability in smaller villages is limited. There is relatively little geographic price variation, and nets can be found at competitive prices in towns and cities. Marketing margins on prices appear to be within normal ranges. No finished nets are imported. Few pre-treated nets or net+treatment combinations are available, with the exception of the subsidized Supanet/Power Tab combination marketed by a donor-funded social marketing project. Conclusions Retail markets for untreated nets in Kenya are well established and appear to be competitive. Markets for treated nets and insecticide treatment kits are not well established. The role of subsidized ITN marketing projects should be monitored to ensure that these projects support, rather than hinder, the development of retail markets.

Pricing Algorithms For a Two-sided Internet Advertisement Market

The Google AdSense Program is a successful internet advertisement program where Google places contextual adverts on third-party websites and shares the resulting revenue with each publisher. Advertisers have budgets and bid on ad slots while publishers set reserve prices for the ad slots on their websites. Following previous modelling efforts, we model the program as a two-sided market with advertisers on one side and publishers on the other. We show a reduction from the Generalised Assignment Problem (GAP) to the problem of computing the revenue maximising allocation and pricing of publisher slots under a first-price auction. GAP is APX-hard but a (1-1/e) approximation is known. We compute truthful and revenue-maximizing prices and allocation of ad slots to advertisers under a second-price auction. The auctioneer's revenue is within (1-1/e) second-price optimal.

Automated Camera Layout to Satisfy Task-Specific and Floorplan-Specific Coverage Requirements

In many multi-camera vision systems the effect of camera locations on the task-specific quality of service is ignored. Researchers in Computational Geometry have proposed elegant solutions for some sensor location problem classes. Unfortunately, these solutions utilize unrealistic assumptions about the cameras' capabilities that make these algorithms unsuitable for many real-world computer vision applications: unlimited field of view, infinite depth of field, and/or infinite servo precision and speed. In this paper, the general camera placement problem is first defined with assumptions that are more consistent with the capabilities of real-world cameras. The region to be observed by cameras may be volumetric, static or dynamic, and may include holes that are caused, for instance, by columns or furniture in a room that can occlude potential camera views. A subclass of this general problem can be formulated in terms of planar regions that are typical of building floorplans. Given a floorplan to be observed, the problem is then to efficiently compute a camera layout such that certain task-specific constraints are met. A solution to this problem is obtained via binary optimization over a discrete problem space. In experiments the performance of the resulting system is demonstrated with different real floorplans.

Preferential Field Coverage Through Detour-Based Mobility Coordination

Controlling the mobility pattern of mobile nodes (e.g., robots) to monitor a given field is a well-studied problem in sensor networks. In this setup, absolute control over the nodes’ mobility is assumed. Apart from the physical ones, no other constraints are imposed on planning mobility of these nodes. In this paper, we address a more general version of the problem. Specifically, we consider a setting in which mobility of each node is externally constrained by a schedule consisting of a list of locations that the node must visit at particular times. Typically, such schedules exhibit some level of slack, which could be leveraged to achieve a specific coverage distribution of a field. Such a distribution defines the relative importance of different field locations. We define the Constrained Mobility Coordination problem for Preferential Coverage (CMC-PC) as follows: given a field with a desired monitoring distribution, and a number of nodes n, each with its own schedule, we need to coordinate the mobility of the nodes in order to achieve the following two goals: 1) satisfy the schedules of all nodes, and 2) attain the required coverage of the given field. We show that the CMC-PC problem is NP-complete (by reduction to the Hamiltonian Cycle problem). Then we propose TFM, a distributed heuristic to achieve field coverage that is as close as possible to the required coverage distribution. We verify the premise of TFM using extensive simulations, as well as taxi logs from a major metropolitan area. We compare TFM to the random mobility strategy—the latter provides a lower bound on performance. Our results show that TFM is very successful in matching the required field coverage distribution, and that it provides, at least, two-fold query success ratio for queries that follow the target coverage distribution of the field.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.