Using Markets and Spam to Combat Malware

We propose an economic mechanism to reduce the incidence of malware that delivers spam. Earlier research proposed attention markets as a solution for unwanted messages, and showed they could provide more net benefit than alternatives such as filtering and taxes. Because it uses a currency system, Attention Bonds faces a challenge. Zombies, botnets, and various forms of malware might steal valuable currency instead of stealing unused CPU cycles. We resolve this problem by taking advantage of the fact that the spam-bot problem has been reduced to financial fraud. As such, the large body of existing work in that realm can be brought to bear. By drawing an analogy between sending and spending, we show how a market mechanism can detect and prevent spam malware. We prove that by using a currency (i) each instance of spam increases the probability of detecting infections, and (ii) the value of eradicating infections can justify insuring users against fraud. This approach attacks spam at the source, a virtue missing from filters that attack spam at the destination. Additionally, the exchange of currency provides signals of interest that can improve the targeting of ads. ISPs benefit from data management services and consumers benefit from the higher average value of messages they receive. We explore these and other secondary effects of attention markets, and find them to offer, on the whole, attractive economic benefits for all – including consumers, advertisers, and the ISPs.

Exploiting the Transients of Adaptation for RoQ Attacks on Internet Resources

In this paper, we expose an unorthodox adversarial attack that exploits the transients of a system's adaptive behavior, as opposed to its limited steady-state capacity. We show that a well orchestrated attack could introduce significant inefficiencies that could potentially deprive a network element from much of its capacity, or significantly reduce its service quality, while evading detection by consuming an unsuspicious, small fraction of that element's hijacked capacity. This type of attack stands in sharp contrast to traditional brute-force, sustained high-rate DoS attacks, as well as recently proposed attacks that exploit specific protocol settings such as TCP timeouts. We exemplify what we term as Reduction of Quality (RoQ) attacks by exposing the vulnerabilities of common adaptation mechanisms. We develop control-theoretic models and associated metrics to quantify these vulnerabilities. We present numerical and simulation results, which we validate with observations from real Internet experiments. Our findings motivate the need for the development of adaptation mechanisms that are resilient to these new forms of attacks.

On the Impact of Low-Rate Attacks

Recent research have exposed new breeds of attacks that are capable of denying service or inflicting significant damage to TCP flows, without sustaining the attack traffic. Such attacks are often referred to as "low-rate" attacks and they stand in sharp contrast against traditional Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that can completely shut off TCP flows by flooding an Internet link. In this paper, we study the impact of these new breeds of attacks and the extent to which defense mechanisms are capable of mitigating the attack's impact. Through adopting a simple discrete-time model with a single TCP flow and a nonoblivious adversary, we were able to expose new variants of these low-rate attacks that could potentially have high attack potency per attack burst. Our analysis is focused towards worst-case scenarios, thus our results should be regarded as upper bounds on the impact of low-rate attacks rather than a real assessment under a specific attack scenario.

SCANNING ACOUSTIC MICROSCOPE FOR CHARACTERIZATION OF ARTERIAL PLAQUE

Unstable arterial plaque is likely the key component of atherosclerosis, a disease which is responsible for two-thirds of heart attacks and strokes, leading to approximately 1 million deaths in the United States. Ultrasound imaging is able to detect plaque but as of yet is not able to distinguish unstable plaque from stable plaque. In this work a scanning acoustic microscope (SAM) was implemented and validated as tool to measure the acoustic properties of a sample. The goal for the SAM is to be able to provide quantitative measurements of the acoustic properties of different plaque types, to understand the physical basis by which plaque may be identified acoustically. The SAM consists of a spherically focused transducer which operates in pulse-echo mode and is scanned in a 2D raster pattern over a sample. A plane wave analysis is presented which allows the impedance, attenuation and phase velocity of a sample to be de- termined from measurements of the echoes from the front and back of the sample. After the measurements, the attenuation and phase velocity were analysed to ensure that they were consistent with causality. The backscatter coefficient of the samples was obtained using the technique outlined by Chen et al [8]. The transducer used here was able to determine acoustic properties from 10-40 MHz. The results for the impedance, attenuation and phase velocity were validated for high and low-density polyethylene against published results. The plane wave approximation was validated by measuring the properties throughout the focal region and throughout a range of incidence angles from the transducer. The SAM was used to characterize a set of recipes for tissue-mimicking phantoms which demonstrate indepen- dent control over the impedance, attenuation, phase velocity and backscatter coefficient. An initial feasibility study on a human artery was performed.

Characterization of Network-Wide Anomalies in Traffic Flows

Detecting and understanding anomalies in IP networks is an open and ill-defined problem. Toward this end, we have recently proposed the subspace method for anomaly diagnosis. In this paper we present the first large-scale exploration of the power of the subspace method when applied to flow traffic. An important aspect of this approach is that it fuses information from flow measurements taken throughout a network. We apply the subspace method to three different types of sampled flow traffic in a large academic network: multivariate timeseries of byte counts, packet counts, and IP-flow counts. We show that each traffic type brings into focus a different set of anomalies via the subspace method. We illustrate and classify the set of anomalies detected. We find that almost all of the anomalies detected represent events of interest to network operators. Furthermore, the anomalies span a remarkably wide spectrum of event types, including denial of service attacks (single-source and distributed), flash crowds, port scanning, downstream traffic engineering, high-rate flows, worm propagation, and network outage.

Securing Bulk Content Almost for Free

Content providers often consider the costs of security to be greater than the losses they might incur without it; many view "casual piracy" as their main concern. Our goal is to provide a low cost defense against such attacks while maintaining rigorous security guarantees. Our defense is integrated with and leverages fast forward error correcting codes, such as Tornado codes, which are widely used to facilitate reliable delivery of rich content. We tune one such family of codes - while preserving their original desirable properties - to guarantee that none of the original content can b e recovered whenever a key subset of encoded packets is missing. Ultimately we encrypt only these key codewords (only 4% of all transmissions), making the security overhead negligible.

Deanonymizing Users of the SafeWeb Anonymizing Service

The SafeWeb anonymizing system has been lauded by the press and loved by its users; self-described as "the most widely used online privacy service in the world," it served over 3,000,000 page views per day at its peak. SafeWeb was designed to defeat content blocking by firewalls and to defeat Web server attempts to identify users, all without degrading Web site behavior or requiring users to install specialized software. In this article we describe how these fundamentally incompatible requirements were realized in SafeWeb's architecture, resulting in spectacular failure modes under simple JavaScript attacks. These exploits allow adversaries to turn SafeWeb into a weapon against its users, inflicting more damage on them than would have been possible if they had never relied on SafeWeb technology. By bringing these problems to light, we hope to remind readers of the chasm that continues to separate popular and technical notions of security.

Modeling the Java Bytecode Verifier

The Java programming language has been widely described as secure by design. Nevertheless, a number of serious security vulnerabilities have been discovered in Java, particularly in the Bytecode Verifier, a critical component used to verify class semantics before loading is complete. This paper describes a method for representing Java security constraints using the Alloy modeling language. It further describes a system for performing a security analysis on any block of Java bytecodes by converting the bytes into relation initializers in Alloy. Any counterexamples found by the Alloy analyzer correspond directly to insecure code. Analysis of the approach in the context of known security exploits is provided. This type of analysis represents a significant departure from standard malware analysis methods based on signatures or anomaly detection.

Assessing the Security of a Clean-Slate Internet Architecture

The TCP/IP architecture was originally designed without taking security measures into consideration. Over the years, it has been subjected to many attacks, which has led to many patches to counter them. Our investigations into the fundamental principles of networking have shown that carefully following an abstract model of Interprocess Communication (IPC) addresses many problems [1]. Guided by this IPC principle, we designed a clean-slate Recursive INternet Architecture (RINA) [2]. In this paper, we show how, without the aid of cryptographic techniques, the bare-bones architecture of RINA can resist most of the security attacks faced by TCP/IP. We also show how hard it is for an intruder to compromise RINA. Then, we show how RINA inherently supports security policies in a more manageable, on-demand basis, in contrast to the rigid, piecemeal approach of TCP/IP.