Blocking Java Applets at the Firewall

This paper explores the problem of protecting a site on the Internet against hostile external Java applets while allowing trusted internal applets to run. With careful implementation, a site can be made resistant to current Java security weaknesses as well as those yet to be discovered. In addition, we describe a new attack on certain sophisticated firewalls that is most effectively realized as a Java applet.

Lightweight Modeling of Java Virtual Machine Security Constraints using Alloy

The Java programming language has been widely described as secure by design. Nevertheless, a number of serious security vulnerabilities have been discovered in Java, particularly in the component known as the Bytecode Verifier. This paper describes a method for representing Java security constraints using the Alloy modeling language. It further describes a system for performing a security analysis on any block of Java bytecodes by converting the bytes into relation initializers in Alloy. Any counterexamples found by the Alloy analyzer correspond directly to insecure code. Analysis of a real-world malicious applet is given to demonstrate the efficacy of the approach.

Modeling the Java Bytecode Verifier

The Java programming language has been widely described as secure by design. Nevertheless, a number of serious security vulnerabilities have been discovered in Java, particularly in the Bytecode Verifier, a critical component used to verify class semantics before loading is complete. This paper describes a method for representing Java security constraints using the Alloy modeling language. It further describes a system for performing a security analysis on any block of Java bytecodes by converting the bytes into relation initializers in Alloy. Any counterexamples found by the Alloy analyzer correspond directly to insecure code. Analysis of the approach in the context of known security exploits is provided. This type of analysis represents a significant departure from standard malware analysis methods based on signatures or anomaly detection.

Towards Formalizing Java's Weak References

Weak references provide the programmer with limited control over the process of memory management. By using them, a programmer can make decisions based on previous actions that are taken by the garbage collector. Although this is often helpful, the outcome of a program using weak references is less predictable due to the nondeterminism they introduce in program evaluation. It is therefore desirable to have a framework of formal tools to reason about weak references and programs that use them. We present several calculi that formalize various aspects of weak references, inspired by their implementation in Java. We provide a calculus to model multiple levels of non-strong references, where a different garbage collection policy is applied to each level. We consider different collection policies such as eager collection and lazy collection. Similar to the way they are implemented in Java, we give the semantics of eager collection to weak references and the semantics of lazy collection to soft references. Moreover, we condition garbage collection on the availability of time and space resources. While time constraints are used in order to restrict garbage collection, space constraints are used in order to trigger it. Finalizers are a problematic feature in Java, especially when they interact with weak references. We provide a calculus to model finalizer evaluation. Since finalizers have little meaning in a language without side-effect, we introduce a limited form of side effect into the calculus. We discuss determinism and the separate notion of uniqueness of (evaluation) outcome. We show that in our calculus, finalizer evaluation does not affect uniqueness of outcome.