5 resultados para cognitive models
em Boston University Digital Common
Resumo:
Do humans and animals learn exemplars or prototypes when they categorize objects and events in the world? How are different degrees of abstraction realized through learning by neurons in inferotemporal and prefrontal cortex? How do top-down expectations influence the course of learning? Thirty related human cognitive experiments (the 5-4 category structure) have been used to test competing views in the prototype-exemplar debate. In these experiments, during the test phase, subjects unlearn in a characteristic way items that they had learned to categorize perfectly in the training phase. Many cognitive models do not describe how an individual learns or forgets such categories through time. Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) neural models provide such a description, and also clarify both psychological and neurobiological data. Matching of bottom-up signals with learned top-down expectations plays a key role in ART model learning. Here, an ART model is used to learn incrementally in response to 5-4 category structure stimuli. Simulation results agree with experimental data, achieving perfect categorization in training and a good match to the pattern of errors exhibited by human subjects in the testing phase. These results show how the model learns both prototypes and certain exemplars in the training phase. ART prototypes are, however, unlike the ones posited in the traditional prototype-exemplar debate. Rather, they are critical patterns of features to which a subject learns to pay attention based on past predictive success and the order in which exemplars are experienced. Perturbations of old memories by newly arriving test items generate a performance curve that closely matches the performance pattern of human subjects. The model also clarifies exemplar-based accounts of data concerning amnesia.
Resumo:
Temporal structure in skilled, fluent action exists at several nested levels. At the largest scale considered here, short sequences of actions that are planned collectively in prefrontal cortex appear to be queued for performance by a cyclic competitive process that operates in concert with a parallel analog representation that implicitly specifies the relative priority of elements of the sequence. At an intermediate scale, single acts, like reaching to grasp, depend on coordinated scaling of the rates at which many muscles shorten or lengthen in parallel. To ensure success of acts such as catching an approaching ball, such parallel rate scaling, which appears to be one function of the basal ganglia, must be coupled to perceptual variables, such as time-to-contact. At a fine scale, within each act, desired rate scaling can be realized only if precisely timed muscle activations first accelerate and then decelerate the limbs, to ensure that muscle length changes do not under- or over-shoot the amounts needed for the precise acts. Each context of action may require a much different timed muscle activation pattern than similar contexts. Because context differences that require different treatment cannot be known in advance, a formidable adaptive engine-the cerebellum-is needed to amplify differences within, and continuosly search, a vast parallel signal flow, in order to discover contextual "leading indicators" of when to generate distinctive parallel patterns of analog signals. From some parts of the cerebellum, such signals controls muscles. But a recent model shows how the lateral cerebellum, such signals control muscles. But a recent model shows how the lateral cerebellum may serve the competitive queuing system (in frontal cortex) as a repository of quickly accessed long-term sequence memories. Thus different parts of the cerebellum may use the same adaptive engine system design to serve the lowest and the highest of the three levels of temporal structure treated. If so, no one-to-one mapping exists between levels of temporal structure and major parts of the brain. Finally, recent data cast doubt on network-delay models of cerebellar adaptive timing.
Resumo:
When brain mechanism carry out motion integration and segmentation processes that compute unambiguous global motion percepts from ambiguous local motion signals? Consider, for example, a deer running at variable speeds behind forest cover. The forest cover is an occluder that creates apertures through which fragments of the deer's motion signals are intermittently experienced. The brain coherently groups these fragments into a trackable percept of the deer in its trajectory. Form and motion processes are needed to accomplish this using feedforward and feedback interactions both within and across cortical processing streams. All the cortical areas V1, V2, MT, and MST are involved in these interactions. Figure-ground processes in the form stream through V2, such as the seperation of occluding boundaries of the forest cover from the boundaries of the deer, select the motion signals which determine global object motion percepts in the motion stream through MT. Sparse, but unambiguous, feauture tracking signals are amplified before they propogate across position and are intergrated with far more numerous ambiguous motion signals. Figure-ground and integration processes together determine the global percept. A neural model predicts the processing stages that embody these form and motion interactions. Model concepts and data are summarized about motion grouping across apertures in response to a wide variety of displays, and probabilistic decision making in parietal cortex in response to random dot displays.
Resumo:
A model for self-organization of the coordinate transformations required for spatial reaching is presented. During a motor babbling phase, a mapping from spatial coordinate directions to joint motion directions is learned. After learning, the model is able to produce straight-line spatial velocity trajectories with characteristic bell-shaped spatial velocity profiles, as observed in human reaches. Simulation results are presented for transverse plane reaching using a two degree-of-freedom arm.
Resumo:
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ONR N00014-92-J-4015); Office of Naval Research (N00014-91-J-4100, N00014-92-J-1309)