Safe Composition of Web Communication Protocols for Extensible Edge Services

As new multi-party edge services are deployed on the Internet, application-layer protocols with complex communication models and event dependencies are increasingly being specified and adopted. To ensure that such protocols (and compositions thereof with existing protocols) do not result in undesirable behaviors (e.g., livelocks) there needs to be a methodology for the automated checking of the "safety" of these protocols. In this paper, we present ingredients of such a methodology. Specifically, we show how SPIN, a tool from the formal systems verification community, can be used to quickly identify problematic behaviors of application-layer protocols with non-trivial communication models—such as HTTP with the addition of the "100 Continue" mechanism. As a case study, we examine several versions of the specification for the Continue mechanism; our experiments mechanically uncovered multi-version interoperability problems, including some which motivated revisions of HTTP/1.1 and some which persist even with the current version of the protocol. One such problem resembles a classic degradation-of-service attack, but can arise between well-meaning peers. We also discuss how the methods we employ can be used to make explicit the requirements for hardening a protocol's implementation against potentially malicious peers, and for verifying an implementation's interoperability with the full range of allowable peer behaviors.

Validating Arbitrarily Large Network Protocol Compositions with Finite Computation

Formal tools like finite-state model checkers have proven useful in verifying the correctness of systems of bounded size and for hardening single system components against arbitrary inputs. However, conventional applications of these techniques are not well suited to characterizing emergent behaviors of large compositions of processes. In this paper, we present a methodology by which arbitrarily large compositions of components can, if sufficient conditions are proven concerning properties of small compositions, be modeled and completely verified by performing formal verifications upon only a finite set of compositions. The sufficient conditions take the form of reductions, which are claims that particular sequences of components will be causally indistinguishable from other shorter sequences of components. We show how this methodology can be applied to a variety of network protocol applications, including two features of the HTTP protocol, a simple active networking applet, and a proposed web cache consistency algorithm. We also doing discuss its applicability to framing protocol design goals and to representing systems which employ non-model-checking verification methodologies. Finally, we briefly discuss how we hope to broaden this methodology to more general topological compositions of network applications.