Collocation Games and Their Application to Distributed Resource Management

We introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general framework for modeling, analyzing, and facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders in distributed systems in general, and in cloud computing environments in particular. Cloud computing enables fixed-capacity (processing, communication, and storage) resources to be offered by infrastructure providers as commodities for sale at a fixed cost in an open marketplace to independent, rational parties (players) interested in setting up their own applications over the Internet. Virtualization technologies enable the partitioning of such fixed-capacity resources so as to allow each player to dynamically acquire appropriate fractions of the resources for unencumbered use. In such a paradigm, the resource management problem reduces to that of partitioning the entire set of applications (players) into subsets, each of which is assigned to fixed-capacity cloud resources. If the infrastructure and the various applications are under a single administrative domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem whose objective is to minimize the overall deployment cost. In a marketplace, in which the infrastructure provider is interested in maximizing its own profit, and in which each player is interested in minimizing its own cost, it should be evident that a global optimization is precisely the wrong framework. Rather, in this paper we use a game-theoretic framework in which the assignment of players to fixed-capacity resources is the outcome of a strategic "Collocation Game". Although we show that determining the existence of an equilibrium for collocation games in general is NP-hard, we present a number of simplified, practically-motivated variants of the collocation game for which we establish convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, and for which we derive convergence and price of anarchy bounds. In addition to these analytical results, we present an experimental evaluation of implementations of some of these variants for cloud infrastructures consisting of a collection of multidimensional resources of homogeneous or heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results using trace-driven simulations and synthetically generated datasets corroborate our analytical results and also illustrate how collocation games offer a feasible distributed resource management alternative for autonomic/self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization approach (centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.

A Neural Network of Adaptively Timed Reinforcement Learning and Hippocampal Dynamics

A neural model is described of how adaptively timed reinforcement learning occurs. The adaptive timing circuit is suggested to exist in the hippocampus, and to involve convergence of dentate granule cells on CA3 pyramidal cells, and NMDA receptors. This circuit forms part of a model neural system for the coordinated control of recognition learning, reinforcement learning, and motor learning, whose properties clarify how an animal can learn to acquire a delayed reward. Behavioral and neural data are summarized in support of each processing stage of the system. The relevant anatomical sites are in thalamus, neocortex, hippocampus, hypothalamus, amygdala, and cerebellum. Cerebellar influences on motor learning are distinguished from hippocampal influences on adaptive timing of reinforcement learning. The model simulates how damage to the hippocampal formation disrupts adaptive timing, eliminates attentional blocking, and causes symptoms of medial temporal amnesia. It suggests how normal acquisition of subcortical emotional conditioning can occur after cortical ablation, even though extinction of emotional conditioning is retarded by cortical ablation. The model simulates how increasing the duration of an unconditioned stimulus increases the amplitude of emotional conditioning, but does not change adaptive timing; and how an increase in the intensity of a conditioned stimulus "speeds up the clock", but an increase in the intensity of an unconditioned stimulus does not. Computer simulations of the model fit parametric conditioning data, including a Weber law property and an inverted U property. Both primary and secondary adaptively timed conditioning are simulated, as are data concerning conditioning using multiple interstimulus intervals (ISIs), gradually or abruptly changing ISis, partial reinforcement, and multiple stimuli that lead to time-averaging of responses. Neurobiologically testable predictions are made to facilitate further tests of the model.