In the wake of the war canoe ; a stirring record of forty years' successful labour, peril & adventure amongst the savage Indian tribes of the Pacific coast, and the piratical headhunting Haidas of the Queen Charlotte Islands, B.C., with an introduction by the Lord Bishop of Derry.

http://www.archive.org/details/inwakeofwarcanoe00collrich

Ethics of war / by al-Hajj Khwaja Kamal-ud-din.

http://www.archive.org/details/ethicsofwarbyalh00kamauoft

The War Between Mice and Elephants

Recent measurement based studies reveal that most of the Internet connections are short in terms of the amount of traffic they carry (mice), while a small fraction of the connections are carrying a large portion of the traffic (elephants). A careful study of the TCP protocol shows that without help from an Active Queue Management (AQM) policy, short connections tend to lose to long connections in their competition for bandwidth. This is because short connections do not gain detailed knowledge of the network state, and therefore they are doomed to be less competitive due to the conservative nature of the TCP congestion control algorithm. Inspired by the Differentiated Services (Diffserv) architecture, we propose to give preferential treatment to short connections inside the bottleneck queue, so that short connections experience less packet drop rate than long connections. This is done by employing the RIO (RED with In and Out) queue management policy which uses different drop functions for different classes of traffic. Our simulation results show that: (1) in a highly loaded network, preferential treatment is necessary to provide short TCP connections with better response time and fairness without hurting the performance of long TCP connections; (2) the proposed scheme still delivers packets in FIFO manner at each link, thus it maintains statistical multiplexing gain and does not misorder packets; (3) choosing a smaller default initial timeout value for TCP can help enhance the performance of short TCP flows, however not as effectively as our scheme and at the risk of congestion collapse; (4) in the worst case, our proposal works as well as a regular RED scheme, in terms of response time and goodput.

Collocation Games and Their Application to Distributed Resource Management

We introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general framework for modeling, analyzing, and facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders in distributed systems in general, and in cloud computing environments in particular. Cloud computing enables fixed-capacity (processing, communication, and storage) resources to be offered by infrastructure providers as commodities for sale at a fixed cost in an open marketplace to independent, rational parties (players) interested in setting up their own applications over the Internet. Virtualization technologies enable the partitioning of such fixed-capacity resources so as to allow each player to dynamically acquire appropriate fractions of the resources for unencumbered use. In such a paradigm, the resource management problem reduces to that of partitioning the entire set of applications (players) into subsets, each of which is assigned to fixed-capacity cloud resources. If the infrastructure and the various applications are under a single administrative domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem whose objective is to minimize the overall deployment cost. In a marketplace, in which the infrastructure provider is interested in maximizing its own profit, and in which each player is interested in minimizing its own cost, it should be evident that a global optimization is precisely the wrong framework. Rather, in this paper we use a game-theoretic framework in which the assignment of players to fixed-capacity resources is the outcome of a strategic "Collocation Game". Although we show that determining the existence of an equilibrium for collocation games in general is NP-hard, we present a number of simplified, practically-motivated variants of the collocation game for which we establish convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, and for which we derive convergence and price of anarchy bounds. In addition to these analytical results, we present an experimental evaluation of implementations of some of these variants for cloud infrastructures consisting of a collection of multidimensional resources of homogeneous or heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results using trace-driven simulations and synthetically generated datasets corroborate our analytical results and also illustrate how collocation games offer a feasible distributed resource management alternative for autonomic/self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization approach (centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.