The Retail Market for Bednets in Kenya: How Well Is It Working?

Background Achieving the goals set by Roll Back Malaria and the Government of Kenya for use of insecticide treated bednets (ITNs) will require that the private retail market for nets and insecticide treatments grow substantially. This paper applies some basic concepts of market structure and pricing to a set of recently-collected retail price data from Kenya in order to answer the question, “How well are Kenyan retail markets for ITNs working?” Methods Data on the availability and prices of ITNs at a wide range of retail outlets throughout Kenya were collected in January 2002, and vendors and manufacturers were interviewed regarding market structure. Findings Untreated nets are manufactured in Kenya by a number of companies and are widely available in large and medium-sized towns. Availability in smaller villages is limited. There is relatively little geographic price variation, and nets can be found at competitive prices in towns and cities. Marketing margins on prices appear to be within normal ranges. No finished nets are imported. Few pre-treated nets or net+treatment combinations are available, with the exception of the subsidized Supanet/Power Tab combination marketed by a donor-funded social marketing project. Conclusions Retail markets for untreated nets in Kenya are well established and appear to be competitive. Markets for treated nets and insecticide treatment kits are not well established. The role of subsidized ITN marketing projects should be monitored to ensure that these projects support, rather than hinder, the development of retail markets.

Pricing Algorithms For a Two-sided Internet Advertisement Market

The Google AdSense Program is a successful internet advertisement program where Google places contextual adverts on third-party websites and shares the resulting revenue with each publisher. Advertisers have budgets and bid on ad slots while publishers set reserve prices for the ad slots on their websites. Following previous modelling efforts, we model the program as a two-sided market with advertisers on one side and publishers on the other. We show a reduction from the Generalised Assignment Problem (GAP) to the problem of computing the revenue maximising allocation and pricing of publisher slots under a first-price auction. GAP is APX-hard but a (1-1/e) approximation is known. We compute truthful and revenue-maximizing prices and allocation of ad slots to advertisers under a second-price auction. The auctioneer's revenue is within (1-1/e) second-price optimal.

A Virtual Deadline Scheduler for Window-Constrained Service Guarantees

This paper presents a new approach to window-constrained scheduling, suitable for multimedia and weakly-hard real-time systems. We originally developed an algorithm, called Dynamic Window-Constrained Scheduling (DWCS), that attempts to guarantee no more than x out of y deadlines are missed for real-time jobs such as periodic CPU tasks, or delay-constrained packet streams. While DWCS is capable of generating a feasible window-constrained schedule that utilizes 100% of resources, it requires all jobs to have the same request periods (or intervals between successive service requests). We describe a new algorithm called Virtual Deadline Scheduling (VDS), that provides window-constrained service guarantees to jobs with potentially different request periods, while still maximizing resource utilization. VDS attempts to service m out of k job instances by their virtual deadlines, that may be some finite time after the corresponding real-time deadlines. Notwithstanding, VDS is capable of outperforming DWCS and similar algorithms, when servicing jobs with potentially different request periods. Additionally, VDS is able to limit the extent to which a fraction of all job instances are serviced late. Results from simulations show that VDS can provide better window-constrained service guarantees than other related algorithms, while still having as good or better delay bounds for all scheduled jobs. Finally, an implementation of VDS in the Linux kernel compares favorably against DWCS for a range of scheduling loads.

Friendly Virtual Machine: Leveraging a Feedback-Control Model for Application Adaptation

With the increased use of "Virtual Machines" (VMs) as vehicles that isolate applications running on the same host, it is necessary to devise techniques that enable multiple VMs to share underlying resources both fairly and efficiently. To that end, one common approach is to deploy complex resource management techniques in the hosting infrastructure. Alternately, in this paper, we advocate the use of self-adaptation in the VMs themselves based on feedback about resource usage and availability. Consequently, we define a "Friendly" VM (FVM) to be a virtual machine that adjusts its demand for system resources, so that they are both efficiently and fairly allocated to competing FVMs. Such properties are ensured using one of many provably convergent control rules, such as AIMD. By adopting this distributed application-based approach to resource management, it is not necessary to make assumptions about the underlying resources nor about the requirements of FVMs competing for these resources. To demonstrate the elegance and simplicity of our approach, we present a prototype implementation of our FVM framework in User-Mode Linux (UML)-an implementation that consists of less than 500 lines of code changes to UML. We present an analytic, control-theoretic model of FVM adaptation, which establishes convergence and fairness properties. These properties are also backed up with experimental results using our prototype FVM implementation.

Lightweight Modeling of Java Virtual Machine Security Constraints using Alloy

The Java programming language has been widely described as secure by design. Nevertheless, a number of serious security vulnerabilities have been discovered in Java, particularly in the component known as the Bytecode Verifier. This paper describes a method for representing Java security constraints using the Alloy modeling language. It further describes a system for performing a security analysis on any block of Java bytecodes by converting the bytes into relation initializers in Alloy. Any counterexamples found by the Alloy analyzer correspond directly to insecure code. Analysis of a real-world malicious applet is given to demonstrate the efficacy of the approach.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.